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ALL THINGS IN PROPORTION? AMERICAN RIGHTS
REVIEW AND THE PROBLEM OF BALANCING
Jud Mathews*
Alec Stone Sweet**
ABSTRACT
This Article describes and evaluates the evolution of rights doctrine in the
United States, focusing on the problem of balancing. In the current Supreme
Court, deep conflict over whether, when, and how courts balance rights is
omnipresent. Elsewhere, we find that the world’s most powerful constitutional
courts have embraced a stable analytical procedure for balancing, known as
proportionality. Today, proportionality analysis (PA) constitutes the defining
doctrinal core of a transnational, rights-based constitutionalism. This Article
critically examines alleged American exceptionalism, from the standpoint of
comparative constitutional law and practice. Part I provides an overview of
how constitutional judges in other systems use PA, assesses the costs and
benefits of adopting it, and contrasts proportionality with American strict
scrutiny. Part II recovers the foundations of proportionality in American
rights review, focusing on two critical junctures: (1) the emergence of a
version of PA in dormant Commerce Clause doctrine in the late nineteenth
century, the core of which persists today; and (2) the consolidation of the strict
scrutiny framework in the mid-twentieth century. Part III demonstrates that
the “tiered review” regime chronically produces pathologies that have
weakened rights protection in the United States and undermined the coherence
of the Supreme Court’s rights jurisprudence. PA, while not a cure-all for the
challenges faced by rights-protecting courts, avoids these pathologies by
providing a relatively systematic, transparent, and trans-substantive doctrinal
structure for balancing. We also show that all three levels of review—rational
basis, intermediate review, and strict scrutiny—have, at various points in their
evolution, contained core elements of proportionality. In Part IV, we argue
that the Supreme Court can and should cultivate a version of PA rooted in
American constitutional traditions and values.
*

Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Illinois College of Law.
Leitner Professor of Law, Politics, and International Studies, Yale Law School. The authors would
like to thank participants in the Yale Law School faculty workshop for helpful comments on a draft of this
paper.
**

MATHEWS&SWEET GALLEYSFINAL

798

5/26/2011 8:59 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 798
I. PROPORTIONALITY AND STRICT SCRUTINY: AN OVERVIEW .............. 802
A. Balancing ................................................................................... 804
B. Proportionality and Judicial Power ........................................... 806
C. Strict Scrutiny ............................................................................. 811
II. ROOTS OF PROPORTIONALITY IN U.S. RIGHTS REVIEW ...................... 813
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause ................................................ 814
B. Strict Scrutiny and Rights Protection ......................................... 824
C. Assessment .................................................................................. 833
III. PATHOLOGIES OF TIERED REVIEW ...................................................... 836
A. Abdication .................................................................................. 837
B. Incompleteness ........................................................................... 844
C. Instability .................................................................................... 847
1. Sex Equality and Equal Protection ....................................... 848
2. Undue Burdens and Abortion Rights .................................... 853
3. Juvenile Curfew and Equal Protection ................................. 854
4. Evaluation ............................................................................ 859
IV. ALL THINGS IN PROPORTION? ............................................................ 864
A. Bringing Proportionality Back In ............................................... 864
B. Objections ................................................................................... 870
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 874
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, disagreement runs deep over the proper role for
balancing in constitutional rights review: over whether, when, and how courts
should turn to balancing. Nor is the problem a new one. Past struggles over
the merits of balancing are etched into our constitutional caselaw.1 American
rights doctrines are a tangle of different tests, some requiring the court to
“balance” or “weigh” factors, and others taking the form of categorical
constitutional rules.2 This mix reflects, in part, the changing fortunes of
balancing, which have waxed and waned over the years.3 In the current
1 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 964
(1987); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Categorization, Balancing, and Government Interests, in PUBLIC VALUES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 241, 241–44 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993).
2 See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 964–71 (canvassing constitutional balancing tests).
3 See infra Part II; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267,
1288–89 (2007) (noting that the Supreme Court adopted a balancing approach to First Amendment claims that
was quite speech protective in the 1940s, which was replaced by a more deferential balancing approach in
1949). Of course, the diversity of legal tests in American constitutional law also reflects, in part, the diversity
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Supreme Court, conflicts over its legitimacy regularly flare into view; today, a
new struggle over balancing is coming to dominate the politics of rights in
America.4
The picture looks quite different elsewhere. In contrast to the United
States, constitutional courts in legal systems around the world have converged
on a method for adjudicating rights claims—proportionality analysis (PA)—an
analytical procedure with balancing at its core. In the past half-century, PA
has become a centerpiece of jurisprudence across the European continent, as
well as in common law systems as diverse as Canada, South Africa, Israel, and
the United Kingdom.5 PA, which began as an unwritten set of general
principles of law, has evolved into a standardized doctrinal framework that
courts can apply across substantive areas of law. Today, judges have raised
proportionality to the rank of a fundamental, constitutional principle, which
they deploy to manage rights claims, including conflicts between constitutional
rights. PA has also been adopted by the most powerful international courts,
including the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights,
and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization.6 In a previous
article, we elaborated a theory of why judges are attracted to PA; we traced the
in the structure of rights found in the Constitution. Some rights lend themselves easily to formulations as
constitutional rules (e.g., “no quartering of soldiers”), and others are more easily read to invite balancing tests
(e.g., due process).
4 In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), Justices Scalia and Breyer engaged in an
unusually acerbic argument about the appropriate methodology to employ in review of a District of Columbia
measure that banned handguns in the home and required that other firearms be rendered inoperable. Writing
for a five-member majority, Justice Scalia focused on the early history of the United States in order to show
that the Second Amendment possessed a categorical, rule-like structure. Id. Once the Court determined that
the Second Amendment guaranteed an individual right to bear arms for self-defense, the law was struck down.
Id. at 635. On the issue of balancing, Justice Scalia stated that the Second Amendment, like the First, “is the
very product of an interest-balancing by the people—which Justice Breyer would now conduct for them
anew,” yet Justice Scalia also claimed: “We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core
protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.” Id. at 634–35. For his part,
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg in dissent, asserted that a “sort of
‘proportionality’” balancing approach is regularly used in “various constitutional contexts, including electionlaw cases, speech cases, and due process cases.” Id. at 690 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Advocating an “interestbalancing inquiry” that “asks whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is
out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental interests,” Justice Breyer
then adopted a relatively standard version of three-stage proportionality analysis to show why the District of
Columbia’s ban should be upheld. Id. at 689–90, 693–719. For extended discussions of Heller’s debate over
balancing, see Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2009); Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller: The
Proportionality Approach in American Constitutional Law, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 367 (2009).
5 See Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72 (2008).
6 See id. at 138–59.
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framework’s global diffusion outward from Germany after World War II; and
we showed that adopting PA serves to enhance the importance of rights, and of
judicial authority, within policy processes otherwise dominated by nonjudicial
officials.7
This Article takes a fresh look at alleged American exceptionalism in the
field of rights review, from the perspective of proportionality. It complements
our previous study of the global diffusion of PA by focusing comparative
attention on American experience and practice. Our analysis shines new light
on American doctrinal developments and challenges the image of the United
States as an outlier. Strikingly, we find that U.S. courts did develop
frameworks for rights review that resembled PA, starting in the nineteenth
century. The Supreme Court first derived the functional equivalent of PA as a
test for state restrictions on trade under the dormant Commerce Clause. And in
the mid-twentieth century, strict scrutiny review emerged as a rights-favoring
balancing framework with pronounced similarities to PA. It turns out that
American judges chose proportionality in the past and introduced it into our
doctrinal DNA.
But this heritage is sometimes obscured in current rights jurisprudence and
scholarly discourse. The nearest analogue to PA today—the closest thing we
have to a common rubric for reviewing claims across different substantive
areas—is the set of standards that makes up tiered scrutiny.8 Not only do PA
and tiered review share certain core elements but, we argue, in a head-to-head
comparison, PA has clear advantages. Far from balancing rights away, PA can
protect rights more consistently and coherently than can tiered review. The
American approach limits the flexibility of judges in the face of complexity,
falsely portrays adjudication as a mechanical exercise in applying law that is
akin to a “constitutional code,”9 and creates unnecessary inconsistency and
arbitrariness.

7

See generally Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 5.
Canonically, the tiers are strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review. The picture
is complicated somewhat by less well-established gradations (e.g., “rational basis with bite”). Also, the
Supreme Court does not always use these three labels. Kathleen Sullivan points out that tests for a number of
constitutional claims, from privileges and immunities issues to public-forum speech regulations, amount to
intermediate scrutiny, even when the Court does not apply such a label. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal
Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 297 (1992).
9 See Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 5, at 88.
8
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Our purpose is not to heap abuse on tiered review for its own sake; its
shortcomings have already been amply canvassed by scholars10 and judges.11
Rather, we seek to show, constructively, how incorporating PA can remedy
problems of our constitutional practice. Proportionality’s extraordinary
success—its value to the judges who have adapted it for use in very different
legal systems—lies in the fact that it provides a doctrinal anchor for principled
balancing as a mode of rights protection. We argue that American rights
review lacks such an anchor and suffers as a result. Nor does moving toward
PA mean adopting an exotic foreign transplant. Instead, this move would
reclaim and build on the foundations that already exist in our own history and
doctrine. We seek to show how courts can construct a modern, distinctly
American PA that squares with the practices of common law constitutionalism,
including a respect for history and precedent.
Together, our claims add up to what we regard as the strongest case for
recognizing and incorporating features of PA into American constitutional law.
To be clear, we are not proposing that PA should necessarily govern every
constitutional rights claim. Nor do we regard proportionality as a miracle cureall that will make hard constitutional questions easier to answer. PA does not
spare judges the hard work of theorizing the nature and scope of a right in play
(a process that triggers PA) nor does it dictate correct answers. PA does
require that judges—openly, routinely, and without embarrassment—engage in
balancing, and many will find this posture uncomfortable. Nonetheless, to the
extent that balancing is inevitable in rights adjudication, the proportionality
framework offers the best available procedure for doing so.
The Article is organized as follows. In Part I, we introduce PA as an
argumentation framework, summarize the pros and cons of adopting
proportionality as a standardized mode of rights adjudication, and contrast PA
with American approaches in broad, relatively abstract terms. Building on the
theoretical treatment of proportionality in our last article,12 we argue that PA
offers a number of systemic advantages relative both to tiered review and to
more rule-based, categorical approaches. In Part II, we uncover the
10 See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 484–91 (2004);
Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST.
L.J. 161 (1984); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417 (1996).
11 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 478 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211–12 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
12 See Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 5.
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foundations of proportionality in American rights review, focusing on two
critical junctures: (1) the emergence of a form of proto-proportionality in
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine in the late nineteenth century, and (2) the
consolidation of the strict scrutiny framework in the mid-twentieth century.
We demonstrate that both of these developments, which mirrored simultaneous
stages in the evolution of PA in Germany, laid a foundation for a structured but
suitably flexible approach to rights review. In Part III, we subject the major
features of American rights doctrine, as it currently exists, to critical analysis
in the light of PA principles. Part IV considers how to give PA principles
greater expression in American constitutional law and responds to objections.
I. PROPORTIONALITY AND STRICT SCRUTINY: AN OVERVIEW
In constitutional systems across the globe, proportionality balancing today
constitutes the dominant, “best practice” judicial standard for resolving
disputes that involve either a conflict between (a) two rights claims or (b) a
rights provision and a legitimate government interest. In the latter,
paradigmatic situation, the analysis proceeds step by step, as follows. In a
preliminary phase, the judge considers whether a prima facie case has been
made to the effect that a government act burdens the exercise of a right.13 By
convention, the judge will use this occasion to discuss the jurisprudential
theories that underpin the pleaded right, as well as prior rulings and other legal
materials that will bear upon the court’s determination of the right’s scope and
application in the case at hand. No important claim will ever be rejected at this
stage. PA then proceeds through a sequence of three tests. A government
measure that fails any one of these tests violates the proportionality principle
and is therefore unconstitutional.
The first stage of PA mandates inquiry into the “suitability” of the measure
under review. The government must demonstrate that the relationship between
the means chosen and the ends pursued is rational and appropriate, given a
stated policy purpose.14 This mode of scrutiny is broadly akin to what
Americans call “rational basis” review, although under PA, the appraisal of
government motives and choice of means is more searching. In most systems,
few laws are struck down at this stage.15

13

See id. at 75.
See id.
15 Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence, 57 U.
TORONTO L.J. 383, 389 (2007).
14
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The second step—“necessity”—embodies what Americans know as a
“narrow tailoring” requirement. At the core of necessity analysis is a leastrestrictive-means (LRM) test, through which the judge ensures that the
measure at issue does not curtail the right more than is necessary for the
government to achieve its goals.16 For many courts, including the Canadian
Supreme Court17 and the European Court of Justice,18 the necessity stage is the
heart of the analysis, and the majority of laws struck down by these courts
failed the LRM test. In practice, judges do not invalidate a measure simply
because they can find one less restrictive alternative.19 Instead, most courts,
explicitly or implicitly, insist that policymakers have a duty to consider
reasonably available alternatives and to refrain from selecting the most
restrictive among them. Most courts will rarely if ever strike down a law
without comparing it to a list of reasonably available alternatives.
The third step—balancing stricto sensu—is also known as “proportionality
in the narrow sense.”20 In the balancing phase, the judge weighs, in light of the
facts, the benefits of the act (already found to have been narrowly tailored)
against the costs incurred by infringement of the right, in order to decide which
side shall prevail. Most judges who use PA would not characterize balancing
in such blunt, utilitarian terms.21 Instead, they would emphasize that the
balancing stage allows them to “complete” the analysis, in order to ensure that
no factor of significance to either side has been overlooked. In contrast to the
practices of the high courts of Canada and the European Union, for example,
the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Israeli Supreme Court tend to
move more systematically to the final balancing stage, especially when they

16 See Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85
TEX. L. REV. 517, 520–24 (2007) (identifying LRM testing as a “central meaning” of the narrow tailoring
requirement, criticizing an alternative approach to narrow tailoring in racial preference cases, and calling for a
return to LRM testing).
17 See Grimm, supra note 15, at 384.
18 JÜRGEN SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 857 (2006).
19 See, e.g., RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, 342 (Can.) (“The
tailoring process seldom admits of perfection and the courts must accord some leeway to the legislator. If the
law falls within a range of reasonable alternatives, the courts will not find it overbroad merely because they
can conceive of an alternative which might better tailor objective to infringement.”); Canada (Att’y Gen.) v.
JTI-Macdonald Corp., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610, 631 (Can.) (making a similar point).
20 Robert Alexy, Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality, 16 RATIO JURIS 131, 135 (2003).
21 Following German practice, PA is not a jurisprudence of interests but of constitutional “principles”
and “values.” ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 86–93 (Julian Rivers trans., 2002);
DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 45–48
(1997).
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confront controversial “hard cases.”22 A court that strikes down a law as
unconstitutional in the third stage of PA will typically use the first two steps to
pay its respects to the importance of the purposes pursued by the government
and to the quality of the government’s own deliberations on the proportionality
of the law.23
Before turning to a more nuanced discussion of balancing within PA and
strict scrutiny, two crucial comparative points deserve emphasis. First, in the
United States, opponents of judicial balancing have largely built their case on
the view that balancing is necessarily ad hoc, open-ended, and unprincipled
from the standpoint of rights protection.24 The conclusion, often presented as
an easy assumption, is that judicial balancing is an inherently undisciplined
exercise of unbridled law making that deprives rights of their a priori
normative status, for example, as “trumps” or “shields” against government
action.25 This characterization does not easily fit PA. PA is a highly
formalized argumentation framework, the basic function of which is to
organize a systematic assessment of justifications for government measures
that would burden the exercise of a right. A government must explain such
acts, which PA subjects to the highest standard of judicial scrutiny. In doing
so, PA enhances the transparency of rights review, not least by making explicit
the justifications for limiting rights the court has either accepted or rejected
and at precisely what stage of the analysis. Second, as a formal doctrinal
structure, PA is on its face no less intrusive, “strict,” or rights-prioritizing, than
is American strict scrutiny. In the United States, however, strict scrutiny is
only applied to a small number of rights, whereas PA is applicable to virtually
all rights claims.
A. Balancing
In classic notions of separation of powers, the responsibility to balance the
varied, multidimensional costs and benefits to society of any set of public
policy options belongs to legislative authority. PA does not challenge that
view. Instead, it subjects the balancing that inheres in policy making to

22

See Grimm, supra note 15, at 393–95; Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 5, at 135–37.
See, e.g., HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Gov’t of Isr. 58(5) IsrSC 807 [2004], translated
in Isr. L. Rep. 264 (2004) (striking down the proposed route of Israel’s security fence as disproportionate in the
strict sense after finding that it satisfied the first two standards of proportionality).
24 See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 984–95.
25 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984)
(discussing situations in which individual rights may trump public goals).
23
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judicial supervision. PA is thus directly implicated in the exercise of
legislative power. Indeed, PA forges important causal connections between
judicial balancing and the exercise of law-making authority, and between law
making and the evolution of constitutional rights jurisprudence. Moreover, PA
comprises a multi-stage balancing framework; that is, judicial balancing is not
restricted to the final balancing-in-the-strict-sense stage, but takes place within
each of the tests. And the tests are sequenced in order of increasing stringency,
so that courts insert themselves into the legislative process no more than is
necessary to defend rights. If a measure does not survive the inquiry into the
means–ends fit, the court need not escalate to a more probing form of
balancing analysis. Consider again the paradigmatic case, wherein a pleaded
right (x) comes into conflict with the means employed by a given measure to
achieve a stated government purpose (y). Under PA, the court must assess the
harm (to value x) against the contribution (to value y) of a policy decision, but
it does so in three different ways. In the first two stages, the court examines
the means–ends nexus, assessing how lawmakers themselves weighed costs
and benefits. The “suitability” test will normally capture laws where the
mismatch between means and ends is most acute—irrational or grossly
overbroad laws that exact a cost in terms of rights while accomplishing little to
nothing. The second test, necessity analysis, enables judges to probe intentions
of legislators in much more detail, not least to smoke out bad motives.26 If the
court finds that lawmakers had less-restrictive alternatives, it overturns the law
as a disproportionate exercise of legislative authority. Thus, the court moves
to balancing in the strict sense only after the measure has survived scrutiny into
how the legislator has already balanced the values in tension. If the
government is to prevail in the final phase of PA, the court must agree that the
measure under review generates enough added benefit (to value y) to justify
the harm (to value x).
Judges who would construct rights in absolute terms, or who would prefer
to build fixed hierarchies of constitutional values, or who would seek to ban
balancing from their repertoires for other reasons, will have no use for PA. In
contrast, most judges who use PA presume that balancing cannot be avoided in
rights adjudication. Modern systems of rights protection delegate massive lawmaking authority to constitutional judges, typically under institutional
arrangements that we have characterized as “structural judicial supremacy.”27
26

See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 436–37 (1997).
Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 5, at 86 (“Modern constitutionalism is characterized by structural
judicial supremacy, where the principals have, in effect, transferred a bundle of significant ‘political property
27
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In effect, judicial supremacy is a tax that a polity pays for maintaining a
modern system of constitutional justice. In such systems, judges do not use PA
to mask balancing, or to camouflage law making, but to rationalize both within
the protective confines of a stable procedure that they see as inherently
judicial.
B. Proportionality and Judicial Power
In our previous article, we developed a theory to explain why constitutional
and supreme courts would find the proportionality framework attractive. Our
explanation blended strategic (political) and legal (norm-governed) factors and
logics, theorized in particular ways.28 In a nutshell, we argued that judges are
attracted to PA because: (a) it neatly “fits” the structure of qualified rights; (b)
it prioritizes rights protection while giving judges flexibility to tailor outcomes
to highly charged political contexts; and (c) it provides a stable, defensible
framework for argumentation and justification that judges can deploy to reduce
uncertainty and to enhance consistency and predictability.29 We then charted
the global diffusion of PA to the most powerful constitutional and supreme
courts in the world. As we demonstrated, these courts adopted PA in order to
deal with the most politically salient and controversial cases that they could be
expected to face. In every system examined, we also found that the move to
PA served to enhance the status of rights and the judiciary’s role in both lawmaking processes and the overall process of constitutional development. The
institutionalization of the framework places nonjudicial actors in an everdeepening shadow of rights adjudication. In consequence, policymakers
become increasingly careful to build records of the proportionality of their own
decision making, knowing full well that their decisions will be subject to
review by the courts under PA. Further, all relevant actors in the system,
including future litigants and their lawyers, government officials, and legal
scholars, gradually begin to think of their roles in terms of proportionality,
further consolidating PA’s centrality.
Proportionality balancing necessarily exposes judges as lawmakers and
raises the classic legitimacy dilemmas associated with such exposure.30 At the
same time, PA provides various means of coping with these dilemmas, which
rights’ to judges, for an indefinite duration.”); see also id. at 85–96 (discussing the concept of structural
judicial supremacy with reference to balancing).
28 Id. at 80–97.
29 Id. at 87–90.
30 Id. at 80–87.
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partly accounts for the framework’s popularity. Here we highlight four
strategic advantages that PA offers the balancing, rights-protecting judge.
First, adopting the proportionality framework comprises an effective
procedural response to an intractable substantive problem. Constitutional
rights are famously imprecise, open-ended, and incomplete in other important
ways, and these qualities are amplified when provisions are qualified by
limitation clauses. While a shift to balancing is, arguably, an appropriate
response to incompleteness, it can only reinforce the perception that rights
adjudication is outcome indeterminate. Nonetheless, judges can bring a
semblance of determinacy to balancing by subjecting it to a fixed procedure,
the most formalized and well tested of which is PA. As important, PA offers
judges the possibility of building trans-substantive coherence, since it can be
applied across the board, to virtually all disputes involving rights.
Second, PA bestows a sheen of politico-ideological neutrality on a court,
across time and circumstances. In any dispute, one party—or constitutional
value—will ultimately prevail against the other, but only with regard to a
specific context or set of facts. Under PA, it is not the law that varies from
case to case, but the facts or decision-making context. In a future case
involving a conflict between the same two values, the other side may well
prevail if circumstances lead the judge to weigh the values in tension
differently. PA maximizes the court’s flexibility vis-à-vis all potential litigants
in future cases and gives the court a structured setting in which to pay equal
respect and honor to each constitutional value on its own, and in competition
with one another, before determining a winner.
Third, PA is specifically designed to reduce the harm to the losing party as
much as possible. The point, formalized by Robert Alexy, follows from the
view that (a) rights, and the constitutional values that must be balanced against
rights, are “legal principles,” as distinguished from “legal rules”; and (b) a
conflict between two principles requires that both be “optimized” through
balancing. However rights are conceptualized, necessity analysis requires
narrow tailoring, which permits the judge to access the legitimizing logics of
Pareto optimality.31 Under PA, a government measure that restricts a right
more than is necessary to achieve a legitimate state purpose can never be
justified, since the right claimant can be made better off with no additional cost
to the value being pleaded by the government.

31

ALEXY, supra note 21, at 40–110.
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As a practical matter, we can expect PA to constrain judicial law making in
ways that can be tracked empirically, insofar as judges actually assess the
proportionality of government measures with competence and in good faith.
As mentioned, a court will rarely strike down a law in the necessity stage
unless it can demonstrate that the law infringes more on the right than a range
of other explicitly identified, “reasonably available alternatives.” In our view,
judges gain an important strategic resource when they treat this (defensive)
practice as a de facto constitutional duty. Similarly, in the balancing stricto
sensu phase, many judges assume an obligation—we would call it a
constitutional duty—to be as precise as possible about how they weigh the
contribution of a government act to value y (the government’s legislative
purpose) compared to the harm of that measure to value x (a pleaded right).
Fourth, adopting PA is a way for courts that seek to secure their bona fides
in the field of rights protection to build their credibility. The recognition of PA
as a “best-practice standard” of global constitutional law is the outcome of an
ongoing social process of diffusion, and of legitimation, that has occurred on a
global scale. This process has all the hallmarks of what sociological
institutionalists call “institutional isomorphism,” in that PA’s diffusion has
become subject to logics of mimesis and increasing returns (bandwagon
effects).32 Faced with similar problems, judges copy what they take to be the
emerging, high-prestige standard, thereby ensuring the result. For new
constitutional courts—or for old courts charged with protecting a new charter
of rights—embracing PA is a low-cost move, compared to the costs of
developing an untested alternative on their own. Finally, PA is a simple but
comprehensive doctrinal structure, which facilitates diffusion. Lawyers, law
students, and judges can learn the basics quickly and deploy the framework
with ease, which benefits constitutional judges in obvious ways.
Steadfast opponents of PA may well concede these points while
maintaining their objections. Although critiques vary in subtlety and
sophistication, most share a common hostility toward judicial balancing per se
and a suspicion of judicial law making and supremacy.33 Consider the
following provocative statement, with which we would agree: “If we ask the
32

The classic treatment is Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 63, 67–69 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991).
33 See, e.g., Stavros Tsakyrakis, Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 468
(2009); Grégoire C. N. Webber, Proportionality, Balancing, and the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship,
23 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 179 (2010).
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question—what does a person have by virtue of a right?34—the answer, under
PA, is that a right gives a right-bearer an entitlement to have her claim
evaluated under the proportionality framework, and nothing more.”
Many who believe that rights express (or positivize as constitutional law)
moral principles,35 or that rights constitute shields (against government
action),36 or that rights have a categorical, rule-like quality (rather than being
“principles” to be optimized),37 will also share a commitment to the belief that
a more principled mode of rights protection is possible to achieve. We are
skeptical that judges can or should dispense with balancing when they
adjudicate rights claims, for reasons argued through this Article, but we do not
deny that balancing may require some to rethink certain deeply held
assumptions about the nature of rights and of rights adjudication.
With respect to separation of powers, PA is clearly not a neutral, analytical
procedure. Compared to alternatives, PA is a highly intrusive standard of
judicial review. Wherever it has been adopted, PA replaced more deferential
standards. (Judges can build de facto deference into PA on an ad hoc basis, but
deference, too, is an outcome of the analysis and, thus, a product of judicial
decision making.) Those, like Jeremy Waldron, who have taken the view that
rights adjudication adds nothing of value to the quality of policy deliberations,
and who believe that principles of democracy are violated by systems in which
courts have “the final word,” must attack PA as inherently undemocratic.38 It
is obvious that PA positions constitutional judges as powerful lawmakers and
that, under conditions of structural supremacy, judges will often dominate law34 See Mattias Kumm, Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On the Place and Limits of the
Proportionality Requirement, in LAW, RIGHTS AND DISCOURSE: THEMES FROM THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF
ROBERT ALEXY 131, 131 (George Pavlakos ed., 2007). The answer given to Kumm’s question is ours, and not
necessarily Kumm’s.
35 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184–205 (1977) (arguing that moral aspects
of rights make balancing inappropriate except in emergency situations); Kai Möller, Balancing and the
Structure of Constitutional Rights, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 453, 458–61 (2007) (arguing that constitutional rights
ought to be described from the standpoint of substantive morality).
36 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REV. 415, 429 (1993)
(describing constitutional rights in the United States as “shields”).
37 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001) (arguing that
the rule-like structure of the First Amendment requires inquiry into government purpose and forbids
balancing); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179–80 (1989)
(arguing that rights as rules limit the balancing discretion of judges and commit them to judicial restraint). The
broader literature is reviewed in Blocher, supra note 4.
38 See Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators, in 23 THE SUPREME
COURT LAW REVIEW 7 (Grant Huscroft & Ian Brodie eds., 2d Ser., 2004); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the
Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).
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making processes and the evolution of the constitutional law. We see such
outcomes as costs that any polity must inevitably pay if it wishes to maintain
an effective system of constitutional justice. If a polity does not wish to pay
such costs, it must not, within its constitutional law, include a charter of rights
meant to be protected by a judicial body whose decisions are effectively
insulated from reversal.
In contrast to the views of more fervent supporters of PA,39 we deny the
claim that PA gives a unique, correct answer to complex legal questions
involving the interpretation and application of rights. As we have already
stated, PA is an analytical procedure, a framework for assessing justifications
for government policy that would infringe upon rights. PA does not tell judges
what weight to give constitutional values that are in tension. At best, when
used properly, PA guides or constrains how judges balance once they have a
sense of how the contending values are to be weighed. Put differently,
balancing will always require some background notions or theories of the
nature and scope of rights, the proper role of the state in the society, economy,
or private life, and so on. PA does not supply these background ideas.
Further, it is far from clear that any court can actually test the “necessity” of a
government measure with any precision, let alone determine which policy
options fall along a presupposed “Pareto frontier.” These are specific
examples of the generic, potentially irresoluble problem with balancing.
Balancing typically involves weighing two goods that are formally
incommensurable in that the respective values cannot be measured on the same
scale or metric.
In our view, these are valid points, though different conclusions can be
drawn from them. An opponent of PA may well conclude that, at best, PA is
little more than fancy, doctrinal window dressing for what is, in fact, generic
law making by any other name. From the same facts, we conclude only that
rights adjudication can never be dissociated from law making; that it will
regularly involve difficult cases; that there exists no stable, compelling
alternative to balancing; and that PA provides the most defensible balancing
structure currently available. We will seek to defend the latter two points in
the remainder of the Article.

39

See, e.g., DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 159–76 (2004).
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C. Strict Scrutiny
Given the importance of strict scrutiny to rights protection in the United
States, one might assume that American readers would need no introduction to
it. Until recently, however, little systematic research on the origins, evolution,
or law and politics of the doctrine existed.40 Since 2005, several important
pieces on the topic have appeared, including articles by Richard Fallon,41
Stephen Siegel,42 G. Edward White,43 and Adam Winkler.44 In this Article, we
seek to contribute to this literature as well as to a rapidly emerging
comparative research agenda.45
Although we will compare PA and strict scrutiny throughout the Article
(most directly in Part III), we wish to emphasize four general points in advance
of the analysis to follow. First, as noted, PA overlaps strict scrutiny in crucial
respects. In addition to sharing constitutive components, in the form of tests,
both frameworks displaced doctrines that were far more deferential to
legislative power and government authority. In the United States, what makes
the scrutiny “strict” is the fact that it negates the normal presumption that
legislation will be treated as constitutionally valid unless the law fails basic
rationality requirements. When the Supreme Court decides to protect a right
under strict scrutiny, the Court’s de facto supremacy within law-making
processes is fully realized.
Second, the Supreme Court developed strict scrutiny in order to deal with a
set of specific strategic problems.46 Fallon describes the standard as “a

40 We do not mean to understate the importance of research that bears upon how the Court has used (and
has changed how it uses) strict scrutiny in specific cases or areas of the law, on which there are dozens of
important articles.
41 See Fallon, supra note 3.
42 See Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 355, 359–60 (2006).
43 G. Edward White, Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2005).
44 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006).
45 On the comparative agenda, see BEATTY, supra note 39; Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 4; Stephen
Gardbaum, Limiting Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2007); Mattias Kumm, Constitutional
Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 574 (2004)
(reviewing ALEXY, supra note 21). In 2010, Law & Ethics of Human Rights, edited by Iddo Porat and Moshe
Cohen-Eliya, among others, dedicated two symposium issues to the topic of “Rights, Balancing &
Proportionality.” See Symposium, Rights, Balancing & Proportionality, 4 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1
(2010).
46 Fallon puts it as follows:
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judicially crafted formula for implementing constitutional values,” specifically,
those rights determined to be “preferred” or most “fundamental.”47 But he also
insists that the Court needed something like strict scrutiny “to impose
discipline, or at least the appearance of discipline, on judicial decisionmaking
and thus to escape the taint both of Lochneresque second-guessing of
legislative judgments and of flaccid judicial ‘balancing.’”48 As we have
argued throughout this section, PA too gives rights-protecting courts a means
to rationalize and discipline judicial review, and balancing in particular. It is
also true that, at times, the Court seeks to render balancing invisible, notably
by treating a right as quasi-absolute.
Third, strict scrutiny contains within it space for balancing—indeed, strict
scrutiny began as a structure for balancing—and the Court has never been able
to banish balancing from it.49 As we describe in more detail in the next Part,
the modern strict scrutiny formula was first consolidated in First Amendment
cases, where it represented a more rigorous and rights-favoring update of an
approach to expressive rights that the Court had long employed. As Stephen
Siegel points out, the rights absolutists Black and Douglas concurred in the
early First Amendment decisions applying strict scrutiny, rather than join the
Court’s opinion, so as not to endorse a balancing approach to rights.50 Indeed,
the structure is sometimes overtly deployed as a “weighted” or “all-thingsconsidered balancing test.”51 Generally, however, the scope for balancing
within the strict scrutiny framework contracted sharply by the end of the
1960s, owing to the framework’s embrace by an ascendant civil libertarian
majority on the Supreme Court and its migration into equal protection
In the 1960s, the Warren Court was eager first to establish and then to consolidate a doctrinal
structure sharply differentiating preferred from ordinary constitutional rights. With rational basis
review established as the norm in run-of-the-mill cases, this strategy required the development of
an implementing test or tests to protect preferred rights. Strict judicial scrutiny . . . furnished an
attractive model . . . .
Fallon, supra note 3, at 1335.
47 Id. at 1268.
48 Id. at 1270.
49 See Siegel, supra note 42, at 394–97. Siegel shows that strict scrutiny was not, in its original guise,
designed to aid motive analysis by “smoking out” illicit motives. Id. at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Rather, the formula was a refinement of the balancing-of-interest approach that had long appeared in First
Amendment cases. See id. (“When the Court introduced narrow tailoring and the compelling state interest
standard into First Amendment analysis, it did so as part of its general ‘balancing/cost-benefit justification’
approach to First Amendment questions.”). Only later, once it migrated into the equal protection context, was
strict scrutiny deployed as a tool for smoking out illegitimate motives. Id. at 394–97.
50 Id. at 394–95.
51 Fallon, supra note 3, at 1306.
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jurisprudence, where it was typically deployed to a different end: to ferret out
illegitimate motives.52
The fourth point follows from the third. To allow proportionality analysis
in domains where tiered review now occupies the field is not, as some critics
would have it, somehow unprincipled or unsanctioned by precedent. To the
contrary, restoring balancing is faithful to the foundational strict scrutiny
precedents and recovers an aspect of our constitutional practice that has been
obscured. This point is developed further in Parts II and IV.
II. ROOTS OF PROPORTIONALITY IN U.S. RIGHTS REVIEW
Building on those final two points, this Part seeks to recover a lost history
of proportionality, or perhaps “proto-proportionality,” in American rights
doctrines.53 Our aim is not to offer a comprehensive or definitive history, but
rather a high-speed and selective tour, focusing on those sites that hold
particular interest from a comparative perspective on rights adjudication. We
look not only at the consolidation of the strict scrutiny framework in the 1950s
and 1960s, but also chart the development of dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine in the late nineteenth century. In both instances, we find doctrinal
structures with striking resemblances to proportionality, both formally and
functionally.54
The picture that emerges stands in sharp contrast to the view of those who
claim a fundamental incompatibility between proportionality and American
constitutionalism.55 To the contrary: doctrinal structures that approximate
proportionality are a recurrent feature of our constitutional practice, dating
back more than a century. Given the importance of doctrinal continuity in
American law, exposing this history subtly shifts the burden of justification:
52

See infra text accompanying notes 179–82.
In a similar spirit, Thomas Sullivan and Richard Frase identify sites in American doctrine,
constitutional and otherwise, where some form of proportionality principle operates. See E. THOMAS
SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW 53–168 (2009). This
undertaking is important, but different from our own. Sullivan and Frase take a somewhat more capacious
view of proportionality than we do, and they identify a large number of areas of law where some form of
interest-balancing exercise takes place. See id. at 6–7. We are focused specifically on doctrinal structures that
anticipate the multistep framework of modern proportionality analysis, where judicial scrutiny mounts through
a prescribed sequence of stages, culminating in means–ends testing and then balancing stricto sensu. As we
show below, this same sequence of steps emerges more than once, in different areas of constitutional doctrine.
54 See infra Part III.A (highlighting similarities between mid-century rational basis review and
proportionality).
55 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008).
53
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the move to reject a proportionality-based balancing framework requires
explanation at least as much as the move to embrace it.
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The early dormant Commerce Clause cases deserve our attention for a
number of reasons. It is in this domain that the LRM test first appears as a
stable feature of American constitutional law, along with the “undue burden”
standard.56 Second, in asserting judicial authority to review the necessity of
state “police acts,” the Court had to overcome the view, deeply held by many
judges at both the state and federal levels, that assessing the necessity of public
policy was a legislative, not a judicial, function. Third, the Court’s dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence was part and parcel of a broader move to give
rigorous constitutional protection to freedom of contract and property rights.
The Court would retreat from this stance post-New Deal, of course, but not in
the domain governed by the dormant Commerce Clause. Last, viewed
comparatively, the Court’s doctrine in the area is all but indistinguishable from
PA. We will explore each of these points in turn.
Since Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in the 1829 case Willson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co., the Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce
Clause57 as authorizing the states to “regulate commerce in its dormant
state.”58 States in the Union possess a presumptive “right” to use their police
powers to regulate market activity, in the absence of federal preemption, albeit
under the supervision of the federal courts. Prior to the Civil War, the U.S.
Supreme Court confronted few (if any) important cases in the area, and it
established no lasting doctrine that is relevant here.59 During the period from

56 Guy Miller Struve claims that the “roots of the principle” go back at least to Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S.
133 (1894). Guy Miller Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1463, 1464 n.4 (1967). In fact, Lawton absorbs the LRM test from prior dormant Commerce
Clause cases.
The first glimmers of LRM testing appear even earlier. In the 1821 case Anderson v. Dunn,
challenging an exercise of the congressional contempt power, the Court ruled that Congress may only employ
“the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.” 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230–31 (1821). But it took
several decades before this test was employed systematically in an important doctrinal area, as we describe in
the main text.
57 “The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
58 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829).
59 The one case still cited, see, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007), is Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), in which the Court
considers the basis for permitting local governments to take measures that would affect commerce:
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1875 to 1902, the Court faced a rising tide of litigation brought by merchants
and traders seeking to invalidate state regulations whose effect was to prohibit
or burden interstate commerce. It met this challenge by developing a fullfledged version of PA: the Court begins with an inquiry into the legitimacy and
importance of state purposes; it then assesses the necessity of the regulations
through the deployment of an LRM test; and it fashions a place for balancing,
in the form of an unreasonable burden standard. During this period, the Court
also derived, from the Commerce Clause, an individual right to buy and sell
goods across borders.60
The LRM test first surfaced in the 1875 Supreme Court decision Chy Lung
v. Freeman.61 The case involved the extortion of Chinese immigrants by
California officials who claimed that impounding shipping vessels and their
cargo—in this case, women alleged to be sex workers—was necessary to
secure the public order.62 Although the facts are not typical for a dormant
Commerce Clause case, the Supreme Court ritually cited Justice Miller’s
decision in all cases throughout the seminal period:
We are not called upon by this statute to decide for or against the
right of a State, in the absence of legislation by Congress, to protect
herself by necessary and proper laws against paupers and convicted
criminals from abroad; nor to lay down the definite limit of such
right. . . . Such a right can only arise from a vital necessity for its
exercise, and cannot be carried beyond the scope of that
necessity. . . . The statute of California goes so far beyond what is
necessary, or even appropriate, for this purpose, as to be wholly
without any sound definition of the right under which it is supposed
63
to be justified.

Two years later, in Railroad Co. v. Husen, the Court confronted a Missouri
embargo on “Texas, Mexican, [and] Indian” cattle, which was put in place for

Now the power to regulate commerce embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but
exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single
uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every port; and some,
like the subject now in question, as imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet
the local necessities of navigation.
Id. at 319.
60 See infra text accompanying notes 71–81.
61 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
62 Id. at 278–79.
63 Id. at 280.
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eight months of the year.64 The State argued that the measure was necessary
on health grounds, given that these particular cattle carried diseases that could
infect and devastate Missouri’s herds.65 A unanimous Court struck down the
law.66 In dicta, Justice Strong noted that the State had legitimate interests in
regulating interstate commerce under a number of public policy headings,
including “domestic order, morals, health, and safety.”67 He continued:
We are thus brought to the question whether the Missouri statute
is a lawful exercise of the police power of the State. . . . It
may . . . be admitted that the police powers of a State justifies the
adoption of precautionary measures against social evils. . . .
. . . While we unhesitatingly admit that a State may pass sanitary
laws, and laws for the protection of life, liberty, health, or property
within its borders; while it may prevent persons and animals
suffering under contagious or infectious diseases, or
convicts . . . from entering the State; while for the purpose of selfprotection it may establish quarantine, and reasonable inspection
laws, it may not interfere with transportation into or through the
68
State, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection.

In his ruling, Justice Strong noted that neither the Missouri legislature nor the
Missouri Supreme Court (upholding the law) had considered less restrictive
alternatives to an outright ban, such as a quarantine or animal inspections.69
Either option would have protected a valid state interest while reducing the
burden on interstate commerce. This appears to be plain PA: Because
Missouri chose the complete “destruction” of commerce70 when less intrusive
options were reasonably available, the law could not stand.
Still missing from this emerging framework was a conception of individual
constitutional rights. The Court first began to fill this lacuna explicitly in the
1890 case Minnesota v. Barber.71 The litigation targeted a Minnesota statute
that prohibited the sale of fresh meat unless the livestock was inspected—
within the state—a maximum of twenty-four hours before its slaughter.72 The
statute was facially neutral, applying to all such products regardless of origin,
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

95 U.S. 465, 468–69 (1877).
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id. at 470–71.
Id. at 470–72.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 470.
136 U.S. 313 (1890).
Id. at 318.

MATHEWS&SWEET GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

5/26/2011 8:59 AM

ALL THINGS IN PROPORTION?

817

which Minnesota argued should insulate the law from censure.73 But because
of the twenty-four-hour time limitation, slaughterhouses in the surrounding
states would find it impossible to transfer their cattle for inspection, ship them
back to the slaughterhouse for processing, and then return the meat to
Minnesota for sale.74 The case thus involved generally applicable measures
that created differential burdens that, plaintiffs claimed, constituted
discrimination. Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan accepted the state’s claim
that the law “was enacted, in good faith, . . . to protect the health of the people
of Minnesota,” but then struck it down.75 The state’s defense of the law,
Harlan complained,
ignores the right which the people of other States have in commerce
between those States and the State of Minnesota. And it ignores the
right of the people of Minnesota to bring into that State, for purposes
of sale, sound and healthy meat, wherever such meat may have come
76
into existence.

Moreover, the statute failed the LRM test, among other reasons, because it did
not recognize the efficacy of the inspection and certification processes in place
in home states of slaughterhouses.77 Here we find the germ of what
international trade law today calls the principle of mutual recognition, which
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) articulated in its celebrated free movement
of goods judgment, Cassis de Dijon.78 The U.S. Supreme Court would also

73

Id. at 326. The Court rejected this assertion:
To this we answer, that a statute may, upon its face, apply equally to the people of all the States,
and yet be a regulation of interstate commerce which a State may not establish. A burden
imposed by a State upon interstate commerce is not to be sustained simply because the statute
imposing it applies alike to the people of all the States, including the people of the State enacting
such statute.

Id.
74

Id. at 322.
Id. at 319, 329–30.
76 Id. at 329 (emphases added).
77 Id. at 322 (“It will not do to say—certainly no judicial tribunal can with propriety assume—that the
people of Minnesota may not, with due regard to their health, rely upon inspections in other states of animals
there slaughtered for purposes of human food.”).
78 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), 1979
E.C.R. 649. The ECJ explicitly speaks of the right of individuals to engage in intra-European Community
trade, which it derived from the prohibition of nontariff barriers under Article 28 of the European Economic
Community Treaty. There is another important parallel between Cassis de Dijon and Minnesota v. Barber. In
Cassis de Dijon, the ECJ (controversially) extended proportionality review to national market regulations that
applied equally to goods, regardless of their origin. Prior to Cassis de Dijon, the ECJ limited proportionality
review to measures that directly regulated trade. See MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, WE THE COURT: THE
75
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come to rely heavily on the principle of mutual recognition, when performing
its own necessity analysis.
By the turn of the twentieth century, the Court had expressly recognized a
constitutional right to buying and selling across state borders. In Reid v.
Colorado, another case involving a state’s regulation of trade in livestock
under the heading of protecting health, Justice Harlan stated for the Court:
Now, it is said that the defendant has a right under the
Constitution of the United States to ship live stock from one State to
another State. This will be conceded on all hands. But the defendant
is not given by that instrument the right to introduce into a State,
against its will, live stock affected by a contagious, infectious or
communicable disease, and whose presence in the State will or may
be injurious to its domestic animals. The State—Congress not having
assumed charge of the matter . . . —may protect its people and their
property against such dangers, taking care always that the means
employed to that end do not go beyond the necessities of the case or
unreasonably burden the exercise of privileges secured by the
79
Constitution of the United States.

Justice Harlan thus neatly expressed the constituent elements of PA. Although
the standard of scrutiny is as robust as any in the Court’s repertoire, the Court
nonetheless upheld the necessity of Colorado’s measure,80 as it had done in
prior cases.81
There is an evident awkwardness to the Court’s derivation from the
Commerce Clause of an individual, constitutional right to trade across state
borders, let alone the treatment of such a right as impossible to impugn in a
legal proceeding. Nowhere does the Federal Constitution proclaim such a
right, and in formal terms, the right’s existence depends entirely upon the U.S.
Congress not taking action under the Commerce Clause. Yet, by the time Reid
v. Colorado was decided, the Court had already embarked on its venture to
construct and defend property rights as “preferred freedoms” (in all but name).
Not surprisingly, the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence of this period

EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION 106–09 (1998); ALEC STONE
SWEET, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 109–45 (2004).
79 187 U.S. 137, 151 (1902) (first two emphases added).
80 Id. at 152–53.
81 Compare Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461 (1894) (upholding a state law regulating the sale of
margarine on consumer protection grounds), with Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1 (1898) (striking
down as unconstitutional a state law regulating the sale of margarine on LRM grounds).
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became imbued with the Court’s position on freedom of contract, and due
process more generally.
Doctrinally, the Court prioritized economic liberty as a constitutional value
by constructing a prototype of PA, or strict scrutiny. At its core is an LRM
test. Although the LRM test was born in dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, it quickly spread to other areas in which the courts reviewed
state police power regulations restricting economic freedom.82 It did so, in our
view, because it broadly fit a general orientation of the judiciary to recognize a
sphere of private liberty—in the form of vested economic rights—that was
viewed by the judicial elite as constituting an inherent, but not quite absolute,
restriction on the exercise of legislative authority.83
In looking back over the foundational dormant Commerce Clause cases, it
is important to note the variability of outcomes: sometimes the challenged
measure was upheld, and sometimes it was struck down. Like PA and strict
scrutiny, dormant Commerce Clause analysis imposes a burden of justification
on the state, and the justifications offered will be subjected to searching
82 Howard Gillman explains this development succinctly. See Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedoms:
The Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, 47 POL. RES.
Q. 623, 629–34 (1992). Nineteenth-century judges understood the legislative power to have built-in limits:
legislation that interfered with private liberty or property interests was legitimate only when it promoted the
general welfare of the whole. Id. at 629. When legislative acts could not be so justified—when they were
arbitrary or class legislation, enacted for the benefit of certain groups—they would be held to be improper
exercises of legislative power and, hence, invalid. Id. By the late nineteenth century, federal courts had come
to police the boundaries of legislative power with a form of LRM test. Id. at 634. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S.
133 (1894), illustrates this approach in practice. The case concerned a New York statute that declared fish nets
in the vicinity of two waterways to be a public nuisance and subject to abatement and destruction by any
person. Id. at 135–36. This provision was alleged to exceed the state’s police power. The Court framed its
approach to the question as follows:

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first,
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the
guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination
as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the
supervision of the courts.
Id. at 137. Ultimately, the Court sided with the state, while strongly voicing its support of property rights more
generally. Id. at 142–43. Three Justices dissented on the grounds that, in their view, the State had violated the
plaintiff’s constitutional right to property because necessity had not been met. Id. at 144 (Fuller, C.J.,
dissenting).
83 Moreover, congressional powers were limited to the exercise of those powers enumerated in Article I,
Section 8 of the Federal Constitution.
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scrutiny. But these frameworks do not contain, in and of themselves, anything
like a strong presumption that the measures under review are unconstitutional.
One of the virtues of proportionality balancing is that it allows a court to claim
doctrinal consistency while retaining flexibility across time and cases. Courts
commit a strategic error when they destroy this virtue by using the framework
in an outcome-determinate way and, in effect, rigging outcomes in advance.
The Supreme Court grew increasingly rigid in its jurisprudence of property
rights and due process in the early twentieth century, just as it did years later
with respect to strict scrutiny.84 The discredit and analytical difficulties that
ensued from these doctrinal moves add support to our case for PA.
PA and strict scrutiny are still balancing frameworks whose use will
inexorably blur distinctions between legislative and judicial functions. In the
dormant Commerce Clause cases of the pre-New Deal era, the Court routinely
confronted resistance to LRM testing, on the part of state judges and some of
its own members. As Justices Gray and Harlan charged, dissenting in
Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania: necessity analysis cannot be separated from
“questions of fact and of public policy, the determination of which belongs to
the legislative department, and not to the judiciary.”85 We think that the PAstyle framework that emerged in the late nineteenth century made sense in the
dormant Commerce Clause domain, just as it does today. Dormant Commerce
Clause cases involve important constitutional values that routinely conflict
with one another in our federal polity, and being highly context-specific, they
are difficult to resolve using a more rule-based approach. Further, insofar as
the Court deploys LRM testing rigorously and effectively, states will be led to
reduce reliance on measures that facially discriminate against out-of-state
goods and services. Instead, they will turn to measures that are equally
applicable to all goods, services, and traders. If state purposes are, in fact,
protectionist in nature, some states will always be tempted to disguise these
purposes by claiming some important or compelling public interest. This is, in
fact, what happened. In response, the Court began to deploy LRM testing as a
means of “smoking out” protectionist motives, using an undue burden test to
deal with the residual interests at stake. This approach is defensible given the
importance of an overarching value: the building and maintenance of market
federalism.

84
85

See infra text accompanying note 187.
171 U.S. at 29–30 (Gray, J., dissenting).
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By the end of the 1950s, the Supreme Court had abandoned the task of
protecting economic liberties under the Due Process Clause. The basics of
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, however, remained largely intact,
although two changes deserve mention. First, the post-New Deal era witnessed
the virtual disappearance of reference to the constitutional right of individuals
to engage in interstate commerce—although remnants of this right remain
today, as Granholm v. Heald confirms.86 Instead, the Court came to rely on
one of several (largely compatible) theories of the Commerce Clause to justify
jurisdiction.87 This change has had little, if any, practical effect on how parties
litigate cases, or how the Court decides them. Not so with regard to the second
change. In the 1950s, the Court began to treat state and local regulations that
facially discriminate against interstate commerce as presumptively
unconstitutional,88 although the state or local authority could, in theory, rebut
that presumption by showing that its interest was both sufficiently important
and “unrelated to economic protectionism.”89 Some Justices began explicitly
using the phrase “strict scrutiny” to describe what the Court did in such
cases.90 The more difficult litigation, of course, concerns facially neutral

86 544 U.S. 460, 473 (2005) (“Laws of the type at issue . . . . deprive citizens of their right to have access
to the markets of other States on equal terms. The perceived necessity for reciprocal sale privileges risks
generating the trade rivalries and animosities, the alliances and exclusivity, that the Constitution and, in
particular, the Commerce Clause were designed to avoid.”).
87 Compare H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) (“Our system, fostered by
the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the
certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his
exports, and no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them.”), with Donald H. Regan, The
Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV.
1091 (1986) (arguing that the dominant value protected by the dormant Commerce Clause is “national unity,”
and that the Constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause corrects one of the main defects created by the Articles
of Confederation—the ability of states to legislate benefits for their own citizens at the expense of the rest of
the nation), and Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979) (noting that caselaw in this domain
“reflect[s] a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional
Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward
economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the
Articles of Confederation”), and S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938)
(“Underlying the stated rule has been the thought, often expressed in judicial opinion, that when the regulation
is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not
likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects
adversely some interests within the state.”).
88 See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
89 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454–55 (1992).
90 See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 360
(2007) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Court has long subjected discriminatory legislation to strict scrutiny, and
has never, until today, recognized an exception for discrimination in favor of a state-owned entity.”); cf. C & A
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market regulations that incidentally burden interstate commerce. The leading
decision is Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., which puts balancing at the core of the
framework:
Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes
affecting interstate commerce have been variously stated, the general
rule that emerges can be phrased as follows: Where the statute
regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
91
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.

Although dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is one of the most durable
structural features of American constitutional law, it has also been subjected to
relentless attacks both from within and beyond the Court, and these assaults
have mounted steadily in the past two decades. The most recent dormant
Commerce Clause case of significance, United Haulers, provides a good
example. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts succinctly
summarized the core elements of this established doctrine.92 He then
proceeded to balancing (weighing the benefits of a county ordinance in dealing
with a waste management crisis against the costs to trucking companies of
higher tipping fees), finding that “any arguable burden the ordinances impose
on interstate commerce does not exceed their public benefits.”93 In his
concurrence, Justice Scalia reiterated his view that the whole edifice of
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine was “an unjustified judicial invention”
with no constitutional foundation.94 He further dismissed the “so-called ‘Pike
balancing’” on the grounds that “[g]enerally speaking, the balancing of various
values is left to Congress—which is precisely what the Commerce Clause (the
real Commerce Clause) envisions.”95 Whereas Justice Scalia would adhere,
restrictively, to the judicial enforcement of the dormant Commerce Clause “on

Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994) (characterizing standard as “rigorous
scrutiny”); id. at 422 (Souter, J., dissenting) (characterizing standard as “virtually fatal scrutiny”).
91 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
92 550 U.S. at 338–39, 346 (“Discriminatory laws motivated by ‘simple economic protectionism’ are
subject to a ‘virtually per se rule of invalidity,’ which can only be overcome by a showing that the State has no
other means to advance a legitimate local purpose. . . . [But t]he Counties’ . . . ordinances are properly
analyzed under the test set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., which is reserved for laws ‘directed to
legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental.’” (citations omitted)).
93 Id. at 347.
94 Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312
(1997) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
95 Id. at 348–49.
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stare decisis grounds,”96 Justice Thomas would “discard” the Court’s
jurisprudence altogether, for similar reasons.97 The attack on balancing has
also been as ferocious on the part of leading academic commentators in the
area, notably, Donald Regan.98
We conclude on a comparative note. The Supreme Court’s approach to the
dormant Commerce Clause, whether viewed from the vantage point of the year
1900 or the year 2000, would be immediately recognizable to any European as
a familiar, remarkably straightforward version of proportionality. The
proportionality framework first emerged as a principle of European public law
in the German States, notably Prussia, during precisely the same period—the
late nineteenth century.99 In the 1970s, the ECJ developed a virtually identical
framework to deal with “free movement of goods” litigation under the Treaty
of Rome.100 These cases, brought by traders challenging Member State market
regulations in the national courts, dominated the ECJ’s docket throughout the
1970s and 1980s.101 The ECJ used PA, in this and related areas, to help jumpstart efforts to complete the Single Market in the face of protectionism and
96

Id. at 348.
Id. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The negative Commerce Clause has no basis in
the Constitution and has proved unworkable in practice. As the debate between the majority and dissent
shows, application of the negative Commerce Clause turns solely on policy considerations, not on the
Constitution. Because this Court has no policy role in regulating interstate commerce, I would discard the
Court’s negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.” (citations omitted)). Regarding balancing, Justice Thomas
had this to say:
97

To the extent that Congress does not exercise its authority to make that choice, the Constitution
does not limit the States’ power to regulate commerce. In the face of congressional silence, the
States are free to set the balance between protectionism and the free market. Instead of accepting
this constitutional reality, the Court’s negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence gives nine
Justices of this Court the power to decide the appropriate balance.
Id. at 352.
98 Simplifying a complex position, Regan argues that the courts should rarely engage in LRM testing and
never engage in balancing, under Pike or any other authority, but should limit themselves exclusively to
inquiry into “legislative purpose.” If the Court finds discriminatory purpose, then it must strike down the law.
Regan further argues that the Supreme Court does not really balance at all, although it claims to do so. See
Donald H. Regan, Judicial Review of Member-State Regulation of Trade Within a Federal or Quasi-Federal
System: Protectionism and Balancing, Da Capo, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1853, 1870–71 (2001); Regan, supra note
87. We find many of Regan’s readings of the Court’s caselaw strained at best, and his interpretation seems
impossible to square with the two most recent Supreme Court rulings in the area, United Haulers and
Granholm v. Heald.
99 See Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 5, at 101 (“[B]y the late nineteenth century, German
administrative courts were striking down [state] police actions that violated proportionality, which was
conceptualized at that time as an enforceable LRM test.”).
100 STONE SWEET, supra note 78, at 109–45.
101 Id.
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collective action failures on the part of the Member States.102 In the WTO, the
Appellate Body would later adopt PA to deal with the legal issues that most
resemble those faced by the Supreme Court and the ECJ.103 It may be that
market integration can proceed across state borders without courts as
commitment devices and without intrusive but flexible doctrines like
proportionality, but we are skeptical.104
While the comparative parallels are compelling, it is also obvious that the
Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has maintained an affinity to
strict scrutiny that reaches back more than a century. While the familiar strict
scrutiny formula, coupling a compelling governmental interest standard with
an LRM test, first appeared in First Amendment105 and equal protection
jurisprudence,106 it is striking and significant that a functional equivalent
developed in the nineteenth century within the Court’s approach to the
Commerce Clause, and later, to property rights more generally. Indeed, a
plausible case can be made for the view that the origins of strict scrutiny are
neither in equal protection law nor in First Amendment jurisprudence, as is
commonly argued,107 but are found within the Court’s approach to the
Commerce Clause. One might even conclude that the Court repurposed a
doctrinal structure originally developed to protect one era’s set of “preferred
freedoms”—property rights, in the pre-New Deal period—to serve the set of
values favored in a later era—free speech and civil rights, in the post-war
years.
B. Strict Scrutiny and Rights Protection
In the twentieth century, dormant Commerce Clause doctrine was an island
of stability in a sea of constitutional upheaval. The heightened scrutiny of
102

Id.
See Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 5, at 152–59.
104 For a view of courts and judicial review as guarantors of credible commitments between federated
states engaged in market-building projects, see WALTER MATTLI, THE LOGIC OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION:
EUROPE AND BEYOND (1999); STONE SWEET, supra note 78, at 7–9, 109–45 (with reference to Europe); Jenna
Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court’s “Unsteady Path”: A Theory of Judicial
Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1995) (with reference to the United States); Martin
Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 321 (Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca
eds., 1999).
105 See Siegel, supra note 42 (arguing that strict scrutiny first emerged in First Amendment cases).
106 See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD: THE SUPREME COURT UNDER STONE AND VINSON,
1941–1953, at 89–90 (1997) (locating strict scrutiny’s origins in equal protection doctrine).
107 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 3 (arguing that strict scrutiny emerged almost simultaneously in a number
of areas).
103
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police power actions infringing economic liberties did not last. It was
overtaken by the decisive changes in the Supreme Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence during the New Deal, when the Court famously relaxed its
scrutiny of social and economic legislation.108 But in a broader view, those
changes of the New Deal Court were part of a still larger redistribution of
judicial scrutiny that took two more decades to complete. The Court’s retreat
from a generalized scrutiny of legislation preceded—and precipitated—a
concentration of scrutiny around a set of “preferred” freedoms.109 The favored
technique for testing restrictions on those freedoms, reached after years of
experimentation and conflict, was strict scrutiny.
Drawing on recent scholarship, this section briefly describes the origins of
strict scrutiny and corrects two common misconceptions. First, strict scrutiny
emerged from First Amendment doctrine, not from equal protection
doctrine.110 Second, and more important for our purposes, the Supreme Court
introduced strict scrutiny not as a rigid, outcome-determinative rule, but “as
part of its general ‘balancing/cost-benefit justification’ approach to First
Amendment questions.”111
By the 1930s, the Supreme Court had begun to afford social and economic
legislation a presumption of constitutionality112 through application of a
rational basis test: legislation forfeits the presumption only when it lacks a
rational basis in the law.113 Time and again, the Court demonstrated just how
weak a constraint this was.114
But another development paralleled this slackening of scrutiny. The
Court’s new posture of deference heightened the concern of some Justices that
important civil liberties remained underprotected. The idea that certain rights
deserve increased protection had advocates on the Court for years, including

108 See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding an order of the New York Milk
Control Board that fixed milk prices); Shaman, supra note 10, at 162–63.
109 See Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution,
by virtue of the First and the Fourteenth Amendments, has put those freedoms [of speech and religion] in a
preferred position.”).
110 Siegel, supra note 42, at 364–80.
111 Id. at 394.
112 See Shaman, supra note 10, at 161–63.
113 Id.
114 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding the
constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute prohibiting persons other than optometrists or ophthalmologists from
fitting or replacing lenses); see also infra Part III.A.
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Justices Harlan, Holmes, and Brandeis.115
The presumption of
constitutionality lowered the baseline of protection and made those concerns
all the more pressing.116 Carolene Products’ famous footnote four gave voice
to this anxiety. The presumption of constitutionality may have a “narrower
scope,” Justice Stone submitted, when legislation runs up against specific
constitutional prohibitions, notably those found in the Bill of Rights.117 Justice
Stone also identified two other classes of statutes that deserve greater scrutiny,
previewing two of the abiding preoccupations of the Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence over the next half-century: legislation affecting the political
process and legislation targeting minorities.118 This footnote in Carolene
Products expressed the ambition of the bifurcated review project: to develop
an elevated standard of review in order to complement rational basis review for
those rights requiring special solicitude.119 But it was some time before the
Court arrived at a stable formula for operationalizing this solicitude for
“preferred” rights—namely, strict scrutiny analysis.
It is often asserted—not least, in the opinions of the Supreme Court—that
strict scrutiny originated in equal protection cases dating from the 1940s,120
Skinner v. Oklahoma121 and Korematsu v. United States.122 But while the
phrases “strict scrutiny” and “most rigid scrutiny” appear in these decisions,123
the Court actually applied strict scrutiny in neither case.124 As Stephen Siegel
argues, the roots of strict scrutiny analysis are in fact found in First
115

See Gillman, supra note 82, at 640–44.
Id. at 640–47.
117 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
118 Id.
119 The phrase “bifurcated review project” is G. Edward White’s. See G. Edward White, The First
Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV.
299, 301 (1996). White argued that the start of this project predates Carolene Products and was motivated
specifically by a desire to afford heightened protection to speech rights. Id. at 301–02, 308–23.
120 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124–
28 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Goldberg, supra note 10; Greg Robinson & Toni
Robinson, Korematsu and Beyond: Japanese Americans and the Origins of Strict Scrutiny, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 2005, at 29; Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach
to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 n.1 (2000).
121 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
122 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
123 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
124 Indeed, the phrase strict scrutiny appears in isolated decisions dating back to the late nineteenth
century. See Winkler, supra note 44, at 798 n.10 (citing, inter alia, Altschuler v. Coburn, 57 N.W. 836, 838
(Neb. 1894), and Booher v. Worrill, 57 Ga. 235, 238 (1876)). We follow Stephen Siegel in taking strict
scrutiny to consist of three parts: (1) a burden shifting to the government to justify the constitutionality of its
law, and the requirement that a statute must be (2) “narrowly tailored” to serve (3) “a compelling state
interest.” See Siegel, supra note 42, at 359–60.
116
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Amendment cases from the late 1950s and early 1960s.125 And in looking
there, we find that strict scrutiny originated not as a blunt hammer for striking
down legislation, but a flexible instrument that combined new and old
doctrinal elements to balance the benefits and costs of rights-infringing
legislation.126
The consolidation of strict scrutiny capped a decades-long struggle on the
Court over how much protection to afford First Amendment rights, and by
means of which doctrinal techniques.127 This contest for the soul of the First
Amendment, which is outlined only in broad strokes here,128 generated a good
deal of doctrinal innovation, as Justices angled for advantage within a
densifying matrix of precedents by introducing new tests or altering existing
ones. A narrow majority of civil libertarian Justices generally held the upper
hand from the late 1930s through the early 1950s, upholding most First
Amendment challenges to speech-restrictive statutes, often by applying the
“clear and present danger” test.129 These Justices also employed a balancing
analysis in a rights-protecting manner, by acknowledging the “preferred
position” of First Amendment rights.130 For instance, in a case concerning
municipal restrictions on the distribution of handbills, Justice Roberts
explained:
In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of the rights
is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the
challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs
respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation
directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such
as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of
democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the delicate and
125

See Siegel, supra note 42, at 361–80.
Good accounts of this development from different perspectives can be found in Fallon, supra note 3, at
1285–97, and Gillman, supra note 82, at 640–44.
127 See MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 46–107
(1966).
128 For a more comprehensive treatment, see id.
129 Id. at 58. The test was originally articulated in Justice Holmes’s 1919 opinion for the Court in Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”).
130 SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 76–78 (describing balancing as an adjunct of the clear and present danger
and preferred position doctrines). Marsh v. Alabama offers a concise statement of how the 1940s Court
deployed balancing in the service of civil liberties: “When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of
property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain
mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position.” 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946). The author is, of all
people, Justice Black, who would later become balancing’s most persistent critic on the Court.
126
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difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to
appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the
131
regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights.

In the hands of the speech-favoring Justices, the balance was usually—but not
always—struck in favor of the rights claimant. During this period, the Court
also used narrow tailoring to protect speech rights, especially in the challenges
to time, manner, and place restrictions on speech.132
The tide began to turn toward a less speech-protective jurisprudence
starting in the late 1940s, under the leadership of Justice Frankfurter.
Successive majorities limited the applicability of the clear and present danger
test, watered it down, or adopted a highly deferential balancing test instead.133
The decision in Dennis v. United States embodied the new approach.134
Dennis, the head of the U.S. Communist Party, was convicted under the Smith
Act for conspiring to advocate the overthrow of the government by force and
violence.135 In upholding his conviction, a plurality of the Court adopted
Learned Hand’s reformulation of the clear and present danger test: “In each
case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger.”136 By eliminating recognition of the privileged position of rights, this
formulation invites judges to “balance rights away”: restrictions may be
permitted when the gravity of evil is high (as with attempts to overthrow the
government), even when the probability of success is low. The repeated use of
deferential balancing tests, along the lines of Dennis, to defeat civil liberties
claims in the 1950s, gave balancing a bad name among civil libertarians, both
on and off the Court.137 Additionally, the gap between “low-protectionist” and

131

Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
The facts of Martin v. City of Struthers illustrate how narrow tailoring was used. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
At issue was a municipal ordinance that forbade the ringing of doorbells for the purpose of distributing
“handbills, circulars or other advertisements.” Id. at 142. The Court concluded that the prohibition violated
the First Amendment because the measure restricted far more communication than necessary to combat the ills
targeted by the measure. Id. at 146–49.
133 See, e.g., Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
134 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
135 Id. at 495–96.
136 Id. at 510 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
137 See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 139–44 (Black, J., dissenting); Laurent B. Frantz,
The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment
Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245.
132

MATHEWS&SWEET GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

5/26/2011 8:59 AM

ALL THINGS IN PROPORTION?

829

“high-protectionist” Justices widened, as Justices Black and Douglas
increasingly endorsed an absolutist view of First Amendment rights.138
Only when the Court arrived at a formula that combined balancing with a
heightened regard for rights did the doctrine attain a measure of stability. The
seeds of this approach were planted in Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, which introduced a compelling state interest test for
the first time.139 Sweezy concerned the contempt conviction of a New
Hampshire college professor who refused to answer questions from the State’s
attorney general about subversive tendencies in his teaching.140 The Court
decided the case on the narrow ground that the attorney general was acting in
excess of his remit from the legislature,141 but questioned in dicta whether any
state interest would justify infringing Sweezy’s First Amendment interest in
lecturing free from state interference.142 Justice Frankfurter responded to this
open question in his concurrence: the state could “intru[de] into this activity of
freedom” but only “for reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling.”143
Justice Frankfurter justified this high bar with a peroration to the importance of
free academic discourse: “For society’s good,” he wrote, the interchange of
ideas connected with the social sciences “must be left as unfettered as
possible.”144
It is clear from Justice Frankfurter’s discussion that he did not understand
the compelling interest standard as imposing a rigid, one-size-fits-all
requirement on state action infringing speech, but rather as creating an
adaptable test that courts can calibrate to different circumstances. Whether the
state’s interest qualifies as “compelling” is not determined in a vacuum but,
rather, depends on the weight of the free expression interests at stake. Thus,
the State’s reason for requiring Sweezy’s testimony was not compelling
because it was insufficient relative to the costs imposed on First Amendment
freedoms. The Court held that, “[w]hen weighed against the grave harm
resulting from governmental intrusion into the intellectual life of a university,
such justification for compelling a witness to discuss the contents of his lecture

138 The “low-protectionist” and “high-protectionist” terminology is borrowed from Stephen Siegel. See
Siegel, supra note 42, at 362.
139 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
140 Id. at 234–42.
141 Id. at 254–55.
142 Id. at 251.
143 Id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment).
144 Id.
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appears grossly inadequate.”145 In his Sweezy concurrence, Justice Frankfurter
did not abandon his customary balancing approach to First Amendment cases.
Rather, in light of the importance he placed on academic freedom,146 he
upgraded to a form of balancing more solicitous of the right at stake: a
balancing with bite.
Justice Frankfurter’s “compelling state interest” language was invoked
occasionally in the late 1950s, in cases where the Court struck the balance in
the government’s favor.147 But it was Justice Brennan who, in the early 1960s,
incorporated the test into a strict scrutiny framework that would become a
fixture of First Amendment jurisprudence.148 Justice Brennan fashioned the
compelling state interest test into an enduring doctrinal settlement that
“mediated the ‘deadlock’ between the Court’s deferential-balancing and
absolutist camps.”149 As Stephen Siegel explains:
On the one hand, as a form of balancing, the compelling interest
standard recognized that constitutional rights could be subordinated
to governmental needs in a particular case. On the other hand, Justice
Brennan recognized that if the compelling standard could be such a
rigorous criterion that its application in almost all cases upheld First
Amendment claims without the need for additional weighing of
150
interests in the particular case.

As an argumentation framework, strict scrutiny analysis combined a solicitude
for rights with balancing in a package that the Court would turn to again and
again.
Justice Brennan began to put the pieces together in his dissent to Braunfeld
v. Brown, a 1961 free exercise case concerning Sunday closing laws.151 Justice
Brennan addressed the question of rights-review methodology head on, stating
145

Id. at 261; see also id. at 265 (“But the inviolability of privacy belonging to a citizen’s political
loyalties has so overwhelming an importance to the well-being of our kind of society that it cannot be
constitutionally encroached upon on the basis of so meagre a countervailing interest of the State as may be
argumentatively found in the remote, shadowy threat to the security of New Hampshire allegedly presented in
the origins and contributing elements of the Progressive Party and in petitioner’s relations to these.”).
146 See Siegel, supra note 42, at 367.
147 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 79–81
(1959).
148 As Siegel notes, although courts applied strict scrutiny in several First Amendment cases in the 1960s,
strict scrutiny only became a cornerstone of First Amendment doctrine in the 1970s, after it had been
embraced in equal protection jurisprudence.
149 Siegel, supra note 42, at 375.
150 Id. at 375–76.
151 366 U.S. 599, 610 (1961) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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that “[t]he first question to be resolved . . . concerns the appropriate standard of
constitutional adjudication in cases in which a statute is assertedly in conflict
with the First Amendment . . . .”152 He invoked the clear and present danger
test, as framed in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette:
“freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly . . . are susceptible of restriction
only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may
lawfully protect.”153 Justice Brennan then assessed the laws’ interference with
free exercise rights: “Their effect is that no one may at one and the same time
be an Orthodox Jew and compete effectively with his Sunday-observing fellow
tradesmen.”154 He next invoked the compelling interest test to move toward
balancing, asking, “What, then, is the compelling state interest which impels
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to impede appellants’ freedom of
worship? What overbalancing need is so weighty in the constitutional scale
that it justifies this substantial, though indirect, limitation of appellants’
freedom?”155 The asserted interest is paltry: “It is the mere convenience of
having everyone rest on the same day.”156 And hence, in Justice Brennan’s
view, the plaintiffs should prevail.
Justice Brennan’s important conceptual move in Braunfeld was employing
a balancing test (framed as whether the interest is compelling) as a way to give
meaning to Barnette’s stringent standard.157 And after 1962, when personnel
changes on the Court cemented a majority with strong civil libertarian
tendencies, Justice Brennan was increasingly in a position to stamp this
perspective onto the Court’s caselaw.
Justice Brennan’s coalitions applied the standard aggressively, and the First
Amendment claimant prevailed in each instance. These cases were not always
precise or consistent in defining how closely the means chosen by the
legislature had to fit the end in question. Finally, in the 1963 free exercise case
Sherbert v. Verner, Justice Brennan yoked the compelling state interest
standard to narrow tailoring, operationalized as an LRM test.158 Even if the
State had a compelling interest to condition unemployment benefits on a
willingness to work on Saturdays, “it would plainly be incumbent upon [South

152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id. at 611.
Id. at 612 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
Id. at 613.
Id. at 613–14.
Id. at 614.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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Carolina] to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would [serve
such interest] without infringing First Amendment rights.”159 The pairing of a
compelling state interest test with narrow tailoring stuck. Here was the mature
strict scrutiny framework, which would come to be applied across a range of
doctrinal areas in the coming years.
Another example illustrates how the Court sometimes employed the
compelling state interest standard as a vehicle for balancing interests in First
Amendment cases during the 1960s. Williams v. Rhodes concerned a freedom
of association challenge to Ohio laws raising barriers for new parties to make it
onto presidential election ballots in the state.160 Ohio advanced a number of
state interests served by the statutes, but the Court, in an opinion by Justice
Black, found that none of these “justifie[d] imposing such heavy burdens on
the right.”161 Some of the State’s arguments were rejected because the
tailoring of the means to the ends was not sufficiently tight.162 The Court also
conceded that some of the State’s asserted interests—such as an interest in
electing the candidate chosen by a majority of voters—would indeed be served
by the laws.163 But the burdens on the right were too great to justify the
benefit:
[T]o grant the State power to keep all political parties off the ballot
until they have enough members to win would stifle the growth of all
new parties working to increase their strength from year to year.
Considering these Ohio laws in their totality, this interest cannot
justify the very severe restrictions on voting and associational rights
164
which Ohio has imposed.

In subsequent years, of course, the strict scrutiny framework migrated into
equal protection analysis and became a mainstay of constitutional rights review
in that and other doctrinal areas.165 And it was in the course of this expansion
from its First Amendment roots that strict scrutiny gained a reputation for
unbending stringency—for being, in Gerald Gunther’s famous phrase, “fatal in
159
160
161

Id. at 407.
393 U.S. 23 (1968).
Id. at 31. The right to vote was also implicated, but the Court’s analysis of these two rights was the

same.
162 For instance, the State argued that promoting a two-party system encouraged compromise and political
stability. But the Court noted that the measures did not just promote a two-party system; rather, they gave two
particular parties a monopoly over citizens’ votes. Id. at 31–32.
163 Id. at 32.
164 Id.
165 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down a oneyear waiting period for welfare-benefit eligibility on equal protection grounds).
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fact.”166 The balancing of interests, undertaken openly in the context of the
“compelling state interest” requirement in some early cases of the 1960s, was
less apparent in the 1970s.167 More often, the Court would intensely scrutinize
the tailoring of the statute, striking down legislation on the basis of its
overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness, so as to avoid having to consider
whether the interest at stake qualified as “compelling.”168
C. Assessment
We have shown that PA has analogues and antecedents in our own
constitutional history, both in dormant Commerce Clause and strict scrutiny.
Strikingly, the evolution of rights review in the United States parallels
developments in Germany.169 In both countries, judicial efforts to protect
individual liberties passed through two distinct phases.170 In the late
nineteenth century in Germany, as in the United States, courts devised
techniques to test state encroachments on private freedoms that set standards
for both the ends and means of government power.171 In Germany, the target
of judicial scrutiny was administrative action, not legislation, and the courts
were specialized administrative tribunals, the first of which was created in
1875.172 In the famous Kreuzberg decision of 1882, the Prussian higher
administrative court circumscribed the reach of the police power: it only
authorized measures to promote public safety—as opposed to, say,
aesthetics.173 That same decade, the court also began imposing an LRM test on
166 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
167 See Rubin, supra note 120, at 4 (“In the courts, strict scrutiny is essentially invoked, not employed.
Despite its name—strict ‘scrutiny’—it ordinarily amounts to a finding of invalidity, not a tool of analysis.”).
168 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), illustrates the point. In this case,
Massachusetts advanced an interest in protecting shareholders to support its ban on corporate contributions to
political campaigns. Id. at 766. But the Court found the statute both overinclusive and underinclusive with
respect to those interests. Id. at 793. The Court “[a]ssum[ed], arguendo, that protection of shareholders is a
‘compelling’ interest under the circumstances of this case,” and struck down the statute for lack of a
“substantially relevant correlation between the governmental interest” and the right to free speech. Id. at 795
(quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960)).
169 These events are described in some detail in our previous article. See Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra
note 5, at 97–111.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 100–02.
172 Id. at 100.
173 In Kreuzberg, the court struck down a regulation by the Berlin police that restricted the heights of
buildings in order to afford a view of a military monument. Preußisches Oberverwaltungsgericht [PrOVG]
[Prussian Higher Administrative Court] July 14, 1882, 9 Entscheidungen des preußischen
Oberverwaltungsgerichts [PrOVGE] 353, reprinted in 100 DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT 219 (1985).
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administrative actions that curtailed private freedoms.174 While Germany’s
courts lacked the capacity for constitutional review of statutes, it is striking that
the techniques they derived so closely resemble those applied by the U.S.
Supreme Court in cases like Lawton v. Steele and the dormant Commerce
Clause cases.175
There are similarities between the second phases of each country’s judicial
efforts to protect individual liberties as well. Starting in the 1950s, Germany’s
Constitutional Court, like the United States Supreme Court, began
experimenting with techniques to give heightened protection to rights of
constitutional stature.176 An early form of proportionality analysis appeared in
a 1958 case, Apothekenurteil, as discussed in Part III below. PA built on the
LRM test that had been pioneered decades earlier, but strengthened the
protection for rights by adding a balancing component.177 The balancing step
ensured validation of even narrowly tailored measures only if their benefit
exceeded their cost in terms of rights infringement.178 The eighteenth-century
natural law scholars who originally conceptualized PA insisted upon this
balancing stage, as did constitutional law scholars in the 1950s.179 Once
formalized in subsequent cases, the PA framework quickly became a fixture of
German constitutional law, spreading into a number of different rights areas in
the 1960s.180
These similar stages of development, in the face of the manifold legal and
political differences between Germany and the United States, testify to the
powerful, functional imperatives that modern courts face to manage tensions
between important values. And they suggest that PA offers real advantages to
courts in that position.181 In both systems, when tasked with protecting rights
174 For instance, in an 1886 case, the court ruled that the police could not require, on public safety
grounds, a landowner to remove a post erected at the edge of his property. Rather, all that was necessary to
protect the public was requiring the landowner to light the post after dark. As the court explained, “The
protection from accidents . . . is indeed the task of the police; this task and the authority finds its limit,
however, in that the chosen measures may not extend farther than they must to meet the goal of eliminating the
danger.” PrOVG July 3, 1886, 13 PrOVGE 426, 427.
175 See supra Part I.A.
176 See Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 5, at 104–11.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 107–08.
179 Id. at 99, 108–09.
180 Id. at 109–10.
181 Nor should the parallels obscure important differences in the scope of review. Most importantly, in
nineteenth-century Germany, judicial scrutiny was only applied against administrative action, not legislation,
and in the twentieth century, proportionality persisted as an administrative doctrine even as it gained new life
in constitutional law. Id. at 97–111.
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against interventionist states in a manner suitable for modern liberal polities,
courts came up with similar formulas that combine LRM testing and balancing.
The attractiveness of proportionality-based doctrinal frameworks is
understandable. They enable judges to protect rights at a high level without
proclaiming any right to be absolute, in light of all important, contextual
factors. Further, they accommodate judges with different views on the merits
of particular disputes. PA channels disagreements on the merits into the
substantive issues that matter most: whether measures are narrowly tailored,
and whether the state’s asserted interest is sufficiently compelling to curtail a
right.
The development toward convergence in the 1960s also casts the
subsequent divergence between the United States and Germany in another
light. Why did strict scrutiny in the United States gain the reputation as a rigid
test, and new tiers of analysis evolve to handle different legal questions,182
while in Germany, PA came to be accepted as an all-purpose technique for
adjudicating constitutional rights? Our response is threefold.
First, when strict scrutiny spread into equal protection, the “suspect class
case” quickly became the paradigmatic application for strict scrutiny.183 But in
that context, and particularly in cases involving racial discrimination, the strict
scrutiny test assumed a different purpose. The intensive scrutiny on the
connection between the means chosen and the state’s asserted interests was
intended to “smok[e] out” invidious purposes—to test the state’s good faith.184
While the narrow tailoring requirement serves this purpose well, this use of the
test tended to obscure its suitability for a balancing analysis. Second, the
dominance of a liberal majority on the Court during the period in which strict
scrutiny emerged helped to cement the idea, on the Court and in the legal
academy, that state measures virtually always failed under strict scrutiny. This
empirical regularity appears to have shaped the Court’s own conception of how
strict scrutiny operates, so that the framework was defined more by an outcome
than by the technique.185 At a deeper level, the predictability of outcomes
under strict scrutiny may have promoted a particular—absolutist—conception
182

See infra Part III.
See Siegel, supra note 42, at 398–99. As Siegel points out, the Court was slow to apply the
compelling state interest test in racial discrimination cases because the narrow tailoring inquiry was sufficient
to ferret out illicit motives.
184 See Fallon, supra note 3, at 1308–11; see also Rubenfeld, supra note 26, at 428.
185 As has been noted, however, strict scrutiny is by no means always “fatal in fact.” See Winkler, supra
note 44. Winkler’s article does not cover cases before 1990, and no one has yet demonstrated how fatal strict
scrutiny in fact was during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.
183
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of rights. The rights-protecting majorities that applied strict scrutiny contained
Justices who viewed some rights, at least, as trumps that admitted no
infringement.186 Although this view was never endorsed by a majority of the
Court, the outcomes of cases employing strict scrutiny appear to have subtly
reinforced the underlying conception of absolutists.
Third, the retreat from open balancing in strict scrutiny reflects the Court’s
attempt to protect itself from exposure as a law-making body. This motivation
is not without its ironies. An open balancing of the relevant interests usurps
the role of the legislator far less than the kind of probing
underinclusiveness/overinclusiveness analysis that the Court undertook in
Bellotti.187 And if the alternative to a principled balancing is the elaboration of
constitutional rules as the basis for its decision, a court cannot hide from law
making. The court that constructs a constitutional code—that derives a rule for
every occasion—makes itself not only a lawmaker, but a supreme,
constitutional lawmaker.
III. PATHOLOGIES OF TIERED REVIEW
We now shift focus from the past development of rights-review
frameworks to the present state of rights doctrine, focusing on tiered review.
The contemporary tiered review regime is the heir to the developments
discussed in Part II.B. As the strict scrutiny framework gained its reputation as
“fatal in fact,” bifurcated review splintered, and the Court improvised new
forms of less stringent review to handle new classes of claims. Canonically,
the Supreme Court employs three tiers of review: rational basis review,
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. But even counting the tiers is no
easy matter. Some commentators have identified apparent deviations from
these standards as establishing new tiers, such as “minimal scrutiny with bite”
for laws directed at “quasi-suspect” classes,188 and others have construed
inconsistencies in how the standards are applied as evidence that the whole
edifice of tiered review is beginning to crumble.189 In any case, the set of
186 As noted above, Justices Black and Douglas, who took this view of rights, originally declined to join
opinions applying strict scrutiny, but did in time. See supra text accompanying note 50.
187 See supra note 168.
188 See, e.g., JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: ILLUSION AND REALITY 81–84
(2001) (discussing how the Court upgraded minimal scrutiny in certain contexts beginning in the 1970s).
189 See Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945,
946 (2004) (“The flaccidity of the strict scrutiny employed in Grutter, coupled with the robust skepticism of
the minimal scrutiny employed in Lawrence, suggests that the neat compartments of tiered scrutiny are
beginning to collapse.”).
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standards that together make up tiered review is our closest functional
analogue to proportionality: a general rubric for reviewing rights claims in
multiple substantive areas. But, we argue, there are serious pathologies
associated with tiered review, including: (A) judicial abdication, in the form of
rational basis review; (B) analytical incompleteness, in the absence of an
explicit balancing stage; and (C) doctrinal instability. Compared to PA, each
of these pathologies threatens rights protection in fundamental ways.
The discussion brings to light a peculiar and persistent dynamic in the
evolution of our doctrinal standards. Elements of proportionality are scattered
throughout American rights doctrines; indeed, as we will show, even rational
basis review, as conducted until the mid-1950s, had affinities with classic
PA.190 Over time, though, the Court worked to shut down the interest
balancing internal to these standards, such that the outcome of rational basis
review, and strict scrutiny, became practically a foregone conclusion.191 Faced
with this rigidity, the Court has brought balancing back in, often in the form of
a new ad hoc standard or test.
A. Abdication
Judges who use the proportionality framework typically begin by
discussing the nature, scope, and purpose of the pleaded right—first in the
abstract, then with reference to the claimant and the conflict between the right
and another constitutional value, such as that pleaded by the government.192
When balancing under PA, the court typically considers how much of the
“essence” of the right is implicated in any dispute: the greater the incursion
into the essential core of a right, the weightier the public interest invoked by
the government must be to justify the incursion. Thus, a court may recognize
that an individual’s wish to consume child pornography falls within the rubric
of free expression, while permitting the government to regulate the harms that
result from the sexual exploitation of children, including to criminalize the
possession of such pornography.193 That same court might also consider
190

See infra Part III.A.
See supra note 185.
192 See supra Part I.
193 In a leading child pornography case, R. v. Sharpe, the Canadian Supreme Court held that a provision of
the Criminal Code, as applied to Mr. Sharpe, violated his freedom of expression but was justified as a
proportional measure designed to protect children from exploitation. [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45. The approach thus
contrasts with categorical, rule-based approaches to rights protection that seek to dispense with balancing once
the nature and scope of the right have been defined. In this latter approach, a court might decide that Mr.
Sharpe’s rights were not abridged, since child pornography is not a protected form of expression, per se. Id.;
191
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political protest to be presumptively protected from state regulation. Only a
small sliver of the right to free expression is implicated in child pornography,
whereas the value of political speech constitutes part of the essential core of
that freedom. The multistage proportionality framework facilitates the task of
developing such distinctions in a principled, relatively transparent manner.
In contrast, as presently deployed, rational basis review leads American
judges to abdicate their duty to protect rights, including property rights, that
are expressly provided for by the Constitution. The underlying doctrinal
justification for abdication is unclear: either the claimed “right” is, in fact, not
a right; or the right is not important enough to deserve the judicial protection
afforded to “fundamental” rights; or, through balancing, the Court has
determined that the right can never outweigh any reasonable public purpose
legitimately pursued by the government. Further, the Supreme Court often
portrays and uses rational basis as a kind of deference doctrine—it covers
policy domains in which legislators, not courts, are to do the balancing. As
regards property rights, the Court traded one rigid position (aggressive
protection of property in the Lochner era) for another (abdication in the postLochner era). We think it is a bad strategic move for the Court, or any rightsprotecting court, to treat a rights provision as either de facto absolute or de
facto without force. It is also indefensible, as a formal matter, to excise a right
from the Constitution, yet that is what the Court has done.194
A telling example is the well-known 1955 Supreme Court decision
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.195 The case involved an
Oklahoma statute that would have forbade opticians (who grind and duplicate
lenses, and fit them to frames and faces) from selling their services and
products without the prior authorization of either an ophthalmologist (a
medical doctor specializing in eye care) or an optometrist (a licensed
professional who diagnoses but does not treat eye disease, and who writes
prescriptions for lenses).196 Among other things, the law would have
prohibited opticians from replacing old with new frames, or from duplicating
existing lenses to insert into old frames, without the customer first obtaining a

cf. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding that child pornography is beyond the limits of First
Amendment protection).
194 We are not the first to take this view. See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER
RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985).
195 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
196 Id. at 485–86.
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prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist.197 Ophthalmologists and
optometrists would also possess the authority to designate which optician a
customer could use.198 Days before the law was to enter into force, opticians
asked a three-judge federal district court to strike it down on the grounds that
the reform would violate property rights guaranteed by the Constitution.199
The plaintiffs also claimed that the statute comprised an illegal delegation, to
private parties, of the authority to determine who would do business as a
dispensing optician in the state.200 Oklahoma claimed that the statute was
designed to promote better eye care, not least by increasing the frequency of
eye exams.201
After extensive testimony, the district court found that the effect of the law
would be to put many opticians out of business202—a total deprivation of
rights—while providing no added benefit to public health.203 Under PA, such
findings can only lead to one result: the invalidation of the law as a
disproportionate exercise of legislative power. Judge Wallace, writing for the
court, recognized that the dispute was to be resolved under a rationality
standard.204 But he did not regard rational basis as a strict deference standard
that would insulate the statute from judicial review of the rights claim. Instead,
Judge Wallace understood rational basis to require verification that the state
had not abridged the rights of the opticians in an arbitrary205 or unreasonable206
manner:

197

Id. at 485.
Id. at 485 n.1.
199 Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128, 137 (W.D. Okla. 1954), rev’d, 348 U.S.
483 (1955).
200 Id.
201 Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487.
202 Lee Optical, 120 F. Supp. at 144 n.37 (“The inevitable result of the enforcement of the provisions
found by this Court unconstitutional . . . will be to literally put said plaintiffs out of business . . . .”).
203 Id. at 135 (“The evidence indicates, almost without variance, that written prescriptions issued by the
professional examiner contain no directive data in regard to the manner in which the spectacles are to be fitted
to the face of the wearer. In addition, the Court is satisfied that the mere fitting of frames to the face, where
the old lenses are available, is in reality only an incident to what fundamentally is a merchandising transaction,
that is, the sale of a pair of frames; and, in any event, the knowledge necessary to perform these services is
strictly artisan in character and can skillfully and accurately be performed without the professional knowledge
and training essential to qualify as a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist.”).
204 Id. at 132–33.
205 Id. at 142 (“The dispensing optician, a merchant in this particular, cannot arbitrarily be divested of a
substantial portion of his business upon the pretext that such a deprivation is rationally related to the public
health.”).
206 Id. at 137–38 n.21 (“The action by the legislature in the instant act is as unreasonable as if pharmicists
[sic] were divested of their right to do business by legislative action which delegated to physicians the absolute
198
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It is recognized . . . that all legislative enactments are
accompanied by a presumption of constitutionality; and, that the
court must not by decision invalidate an enactment merely because in
the court’s opinion the legislature acted unwisely. Likewise, where
the statute touches upon the public health and welfare, the statute
cannot be deemed unconstitutional class legislation, even though a
specific class of persons or businesses is singled out, where the
legislation in its impact is free of caprice and discrimination and is
rationally related to the public good. A court only can annul
legislative action where it appears certain that the attempted exercise
207
of police power is arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory.

In this passage, Judge Wallace took pains to distinguish his approach from the
kind of robotic formalism that had so discredited “reasonableness” review
during the so-called Lochner era. His opinion incorporated elements of PA
into its analysis. Citing what he considered stable precedent, Judge Wallace
concluded that the state’s exercise of police powers would be justified only if
the state could show, “[f]irst, that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and,
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.”208 He then disposed of
the case in ways that anyone versed in PA would find familiar209:
The means chosen by the legislature does not bear “a real and
substantial relation” to the end sought, that is, better vision, inasmuch
as . . . [ophthalmologists and optometrists] possess no knowledge or
skill superior to a qualified practicing optician . . . and in fact
[ophthalmologists and optometrists], as a class, are not as well
control and responsibility for accurate compounding of medical prescriptions for the reason that a physician
alone is qualified to prescribe drugs for patients.”).
207 Id. at 132.
208 Id. at 137 (emphasis added) (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)).
209 Concurring with this portion of the decision, Judge Murrah’s opinion also has the feel of a standard
proportionality analysis:
The obvious result of this legislation is to appropriate a property right of one class to follow a
legitimate calling or occupation and to give it to another class not shown to be more competent in
the public interest. Indeed, the evidence shows that it would be inimical to the public interest to
require the wearer of eye glasses to return to the ophthalmologist in order to obtain a prescription
for the replacement or duplication of an eye glass, or to place the burden upon the
ophthalmologist of merchandising frames and mountings and other appliances, or placing that
purely commercial monopoly in the optometrist. There is no rational basis for depriving the
optician of the right to perform this purely mechanical and commercial service to the public.
Id. at 144 (Murrah, J., dissenting in part) (dissenting on provisions affecting advertising, which we do not
discuss here).
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qualified as opticians as a class to either supervise or perform the
210
services here regulated.

The district court held that three provisions of the Oklahoma statute violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that one provision
violated the Equal Protection Clause of that same Amendment.
It is crucial to stress that the district court did not find elements of PA alien
or inimical to rational basis review. As we found with respect to earlier
versions of strict scrutiny,211 American judges considered necessity analysis
and balancing to be inherent parts of the judicial repertoire when they
adjudicated rights.
The Supreme Court overturned the district court’s (much more nuanced)
decision without so much as a single word concerning the rights being pleaded,
and without serious consideration of facts or policy. Instead, Justice Douglas,
writing for a unanimous Court, simply abdicated:
The Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in
many cases. But it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the
advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement. . . . It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might
be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way
to correct it.
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of
business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.
We emphasize again what Chief Justice Waite said in Munn v.
Illinois, “For protection against abuses by legislatures the people
212
must resort to the polls, not to the courts.”

Abdication also entailed an extraordinary act of constitutional law making: the
Supreme Court rewrote the U.S. Constitution so as to deprive individuals of
the judicial protection of rights expressly guaranteed by that same
Constitution.213 Arguably, this decision is one of the most poorly reasoned by

210

Id. at 138.
See supra Part II.
212 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 497–88 (1955) (citations omitted) (quoting
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877)).
213 Justice Field’s dissent from Munn v. Illinois, which Justice Douglas cites as authority, applies equally
well to Lee Optical:
211
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the Court in an important case. Indeed, it contains virtually no rights reasoning
whatsoever.214
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Lee Optical and its enduring effects deserve
to be considered in light of what the German Federal Constitutional Court
(GFCC) was doing at the same time. In Apothekenurteil,215 one of its earliest
balancing cases, in 1958, a druggist challenged a Bavarian law regulating
drugstores on the ground that it violated Article 12(1) of the Basic Law,216
which provides for occupational freedom. The law authorized the licensing of
new pharmacies only when “in the public interest” and only when new stores
would not destabilize the market by threatening the viability of existing
pharmacies.217 In framing its analysis, the GFCC squarely confronted the
tension between individual rights and public goals, which led it to embrace
balancing:
The constitutional right should protect the freedom of the
individual; the professional regulation should ensure sufficient
protection of societal interests. The individual’s claim to freedom
has a stronger effect . . . the more his right to free choice of a
profession is put into question; the protection of the public becomes
more urgent, the greater the disadvantages are, that come from the
free practicing of professions. When one seeks to maximize

The construction actually given by . . . this court makes the provision, in the language of Taney, a
protection to “a mere barren and abstract right, without any practical operation upon the business
of life,” and renders it “illusive and nugatory, mere words of form, affording no protection and
producing no practical result.”
94 U.S. 113, 145 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311, 318 (1843)).
214 With respect to the equal protection claim, Justice Douglas had only this to say:
The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition.
Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different
remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing
itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature
may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. The
prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination. We
cannot say that that point has been reached here.
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 489 (citations omitted).
215 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 11, 1958, 7
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 377 (Ger.).
216 Article 12(1) states, “All Germans shall have the right freely to choose their occupation or profession,
their place of work and their place of training. The practice of an occupation or profession may be regulated
by or pursuant to a law.” GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG]
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 12(1) (Ger.).
217 7 BVERFGE 377 (380).
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both . . . equally legitimate . . . demands in the most effective way,
then the solution can only lie in a careful balancing [Abwägung] of
218
the meaning of the two opposed and perhaps conflicting interests.

In a rich and complex decision, the court then elaborated an early version of
PA, tailored to the specifics of Article 12(1),219 and annulled the law on
necessity grounds. In a case decided the next year, the German Court
dismissed claims under Article 12(1), upholding a law that prohibited
businesses other than licensed pharmacies from selling prepackaged,
nonprescription drugs at retail.220 It held that public health would be better
served if all drugs were sold by trained professionals, and that pharmacies
would be economically imperiled if they could no longer rely on this stream of
income.221
The German Court did not use these cases to lay a procrustean bed that
would then force every set of facts to the same result. On the contrary, it
developed a flexible balancing framework capable of adaptation to changing
circumstances. While balancing may lead to inconsistent outcomes (a
functional economic argument is rejected in the first case but accepted in the
second, if on different facts222), the GFCC did not abdicate its constitutional
duties. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the GFCC (a new jurisdiction whose
political legitimacy remained to be tested) did not tell rights claimants: “go to
the polls, not the courts.” Rather, it fully accepted the responsibility that
attends the power of judicial review. Taking a wider perspective, the German
Court’s commitment to proportionality balancing has helped it avoid the kinds
of problems that the U.S. Supreme Court created for itself. In the pre-New
Deal era, the American Court committed itself to defending freedom of
contract and laissez-faire capitalism against market regulation, as if that
defense was one of its central institutional missions; it then abandoned
property rights altogether. In contrast, the German Court has consistently held
that the Basic Law is “neutral” with respect to the kind of economic system or

218

7 BVERFGE 377 (404–05).
7 BVERFGE 377 (396–12). The case was decided before the GFCC had fully developed the
proportionality principle. Today there is one proportionality test for all fundamental rights. Stone Sweet &
Mathews, supra note 5, at 110–11.
220 BVerfG Jan. 7, 1959, 9 BVERFGE 73 (82).
221 9 BVerfGE 73 (76–81).
222 See Paul G. Kauper, The Constitutions of West Germany and the United States: A Comparative Study,
58 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1130 (1960).
219
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regulation fashioned by the legislator.223 Yet, that position has never entailed
abdication.224 On the contrary, one of the major responsibilities of the GFCC
has been to define the reciprocal limits of market regulation and property
rights225 as German society and the economy have evolved. While doing so, it
has sometimes angered the Christian Democratic Right, sometimes the Social
Democratic Left, but it has never, over more than five decades, lost its
centrality to economic governance. The German Court would have failed, as
did the American Supreme Court, had it embraced rigidity and absolutism.
B. Incompleteness
From the perspective of a judge who systematically uses PA to manage
rights litigation, the Supreme Court’s use of variegated approaches can at times
seem casual or worse—unprincipled. The American judge is much more
comfortable omitting analytical steps that the PA judge would view as
essential. The PA judge always begins with a general discussion of the right
being pleaded as a matter of constitutional structure or theory, and in light of
past rulings. Once a right has been so constructed, the judge then turns to PA.
If the government measure under review survives necessity analysis, then the
balancing-in-the-strict-sense stage will allow the judge to ensure that the law
does not infringe too much on the right, given the polity’s constitutional
commitments. The judge thus begins with a relatively abstract construction of
the right and ends with analysis of the right in a specific conflict with an
opposing value. The American judge may leave out one or both of these steps,
even in strict scrutiny, as when the judge performs the compelling interest
inquiry without serious consideration of the right, or balancing.
223 The leading decision is the Investment Aid I case, BVerfG July 20, 1959, 4 BVERFGE 7. A translation
and commentary can be found in KOMMERS, supra note 21, at 243–45.
224 The GFCC seeks to reduce, as much as possible, the tension between the pleaded property right and
the public good resulting from a limitation of property rights; that is, the GFCC balances among contending
constitutional values in light of the context of the case. In cases like Lee Optical, the U.S. Supreme Court has
little use for either the Constitution or context. For a superb comparison of German and American approaches
to property rights as constitutional rights, see Gregory S. Alexander, Property as a Fundamental
Constitutional Right? The German Example, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (2003).
225 The Basic Law provides for the right to property in Article 14, which qualifies the right to property in
a manner that strongly implies the use of PA. GG art. 14 (“(1) Property and the right of inheritance shall be
guaranteed. Their content and limits shall be defined by the laws. (2) Property entails obligations. Its use
shall also serve the public good. (3) Expropriation shall only be permissible for the public good. It may only
be ordered by or pursuant to a law that determines the nature and extent of compensation. Such compensation
shall be determined by establishing an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those
affected. In case of dispute concerning the amount of compensation, recourse may be had to the ordinary
courts.”).
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A well-known example of egregious incompleteness is United States v.
O’Brien.226 Mr. O’Brien had burned his draft card, in violation of federal
statutes, while protesting the Vietnam War and military conscription.227
Although the case raised important questions about the government’s use of a
statutory amendment to stifle protest,228 our focus here is on the Supreme
Court’s treatment of the right to “wordless” or “symbolic” speech. The Court
mentioned but took no firm position on the question of whether O’Brien’s act
was to be considered “speech” under the First Amendment—the inquiry was
simply left incomplete.229 Instead, the Court formulated the following test:
This Court has held that when “speech” and “nonspeech” elements
are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize
the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court
has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial;
subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision
inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government regulation
is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
230
of that interest.

The Court did not distinguish a “compelling interest” from a “substantial
interest”; on the contrary, it was implied that the “descriptive terms” listed
were broadly synonymous. On the basis of this test, the Court upheld
O’Brien’s conviction, since the draft card fulfilled a variety of administrative
functions, such as communicating the rights and duties of the bearer.231
226

391 U.S. 367 (1968).
See id. at 369–70, 376.
228 In 1965, Congress adopted an amendment to the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948
in part to deter those who would burn their draft cards in protest of the war. See id. at 370, 385–86. The
circuit court, noting that O’Brien’s action was already punishable under a separate regulation, declared the
amendment unconstitutional on the grounds that it was expressly designed to limit speech. O’Brien v. United
States, 376 F.2d 538, 540–41 (1st Cir. 1967), vacated, 391 U.S. 367.
229 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (“We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of
conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea. However, even on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O’Brien’s conduct is
sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a
registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity.”).
230 Id. at 376–77 (footnotes omitted).
231 Id. at 378–80, 382.
227
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The judgment concluded in deafening silence on the question of whether
the government’s interest did or did not outweigh O’Brien’s “alleged” speech
right—the answer to which one might have learned if the framework contained
a balancing-in-the-strict-sense phase. The Court might also have balanced the
contending values in its discussion of the nature of the government’s
“important or significant” interest; instead it marched through the test while
saying nothing of any importance about speech. To resolve such a case under
a standard version of PA, the Court would have been required to consider the
nature and scope of the right at play upfront, and then to ensure that the right
did not get lost in the analysis of the government’s position at the end.
O’Brien may illustrate something else about American rights review. As
we mentioned, O’Brien did not subscribe to the literal strict scrutiny formula of
“compelling” state interest; a “substantial” or “important” government interest
would do.232 This position is subject to different interpretations. Some might
view O’Brien as a strict scrutiny case in all but name; others might reject this
conclusion, especially in light of the result—the government wins.233 But if
O’Brien is not a strict scrutiny case, what is it?
O’Brien may well be a forerunner of the intermediate scrutiny tests that
would proliferate starting in the 1970s.234 Like the standard in O’Brien, the
canonical intermediate scrutiny test also requires an “important” state interest
(although it does not impose a narrow tailoring test).235 To the extent that we
regard the O’Brien standard as an early intermediate scrutiny test, the case
follows another pattern. As with the strict scrutiny framework, we see the
Court undertaking a doctrinal innovation with respect to the vanguard of civil
liberties—First Amendment rights—which in short order spreads to other
constitutional rights. We discuss the creation of intermediate forms of scrutiny
immediately below.
C. Instability
The third pathology is related to the first two. In the classic “bifurcated
review” regime, judges are asked to sort cases into two bins that represent
232

See id. at 366–67.
See id. at 386.
234 Kathleen Sullivan, for one, views the O’Brien test as a version of intermediate scrutiny. Sullivan,
supra note 8, at 297.
235 For example, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), discussed in Part III.C.1 infra. Instead of
narrow tailoring, the test required a “substantial” relation between the policy and the government’s objectives,
again echoing O’Brien’s language. See id.
233
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extremes of stringency and deference.236 The inadequacy of these options
generates a persistent instability in the doctrinal structure. Time and again, the
Court has introduced an intermediate standard of review to govern its inquiry
in different areas of law.237 Forms of intermediate review represent efforts to
make a space for balancing in the context of rights review. As such, they are
also symptomatic of the dysfunctionality of classic two-tiered review.
But the ad hoc introduction of new standards of review does not “solve the
problem” of two-tiered review; rather, it creates new problems. For all its
faults, the two-tiered framework of review was at least rooted in a coherent
distinction between economic liberties and “preferred” fundamental rights.238
Adding new tiers registers as a deviation from this baseline and may come
across as an unprincipled or illegitimate move. The dissenting opinions in the
cases that first adopt intermediate scrutiny reliably paint them in this light.239
More generally, defections from bifurcated review undermine the stability
of rights adjudication. Because we have no meta-theory of rights that maps
certain classes of claims into standards of review, confusion and contention
over the proper standard are common, particularly when new rights claims
arise. The unpredictability and instability of tiered review are partly to blame
for the fact that so much of the analytic firepower in our constitutional caselaw
is aimed at the standard of review, rather than the substance of the claim.240
We illustrate these points by looking at cases where courts elaborate new
standards of review in an attempt to introduce some balancing into the
analysis. We first discuss two developments well-known to students of
constitutional law: the Supreme Court’s changing approach to sex
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey’s revisions to the Roe v. Wade framework
236

See White, supra note 119, at 301 (describing the Court’s “bifurcated review project”).
Also, on occasion the Court has claimed to be applying one of the two canonical standards, but
transparently not done so. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(recognizing that a law discriminating against mentally retarded individuals does not merit heightened scrutiny
because mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect class, but finding that the law fails to rationally relate to any
of its various justifications, suggesting that the Court was actually applying a higher standard than rational
basis review).
238 See Gillman, supra note 82, at 623–26; White, supra note 119, at 309.
239 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 244 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s
application of intermediate scrutiny to a statute that deprives illegal alien children of the right to public
education); Craig, 429 U.S. at 220–21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s application of
intermediate scrutiny to a law that imposes different drinking ages for men and women).
240 See White, supra note 43, at 82–83.
237
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for abortion rights. Our treatment of these exhaustively studied developments
is brisk and focuses on the shifts in doctrine. We also consider in some detail a
lesser known federal appeals court case, involving a constitutional challenge to
a local juvenile curfew. This case shows a court trying to fit a new
classification into the existing tiers, and the difficulties and conflicts that
ensue.241 We pair familiar and unfamiliar cases deliberately, to underscore the
pervasiveness of the difficulties with tiered review.242
1. Sex Equality and Equal Protection
The equal protection jurisprudence of sex classifications has famously
followed a meandering course. The Supreme Court originally subjected sex
classifications to rational basis review, then increased the scrutiny without
formally changing the standard, even flirting with full suspect classification
status before devising a new standard of intermediate scrutiny. Then, in time,
the intermediate scrutiny standard drifted upward to become more stringent.
From a comparative perspective, one cause of this well-known evolution seems
clear. The inherited two-tier framework offered the Court no opportunity to
measure the harms of gender distinctions against their benefits, and the Court
has struggled ever since to find a workable formula for doing so.
In the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court subjected sex
classifications to rational basis review and often upheld them.243 As traditional
attitudes about gender roles began to fade, it became apparent that rational
basis review provided women with no meaningful guarantee to equal
protection of the laws.244 In Reed v. Reed, Chief Justice Burger, writing for a
unanimous Court, struck down an Idaho law giving preference to men in estate
administration, ostensibly on a rational basis standard.245 But the opinion
241

Another line of prominent cases in which the Court shifts the standard of review, with dramatic results,
includes Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (applying intermediate scrutiny to affirmative
action policies in broadcasting), and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny to affirmative action policy in federal contracting program).
242 Tiered review is also a pervasive feature of state constitutional doctrine, which space prevents us from
discussing in this Article. Notably, states have also been at the forefront of experimenting with rights review,
and some have opted out of tiered review of their constitutional claims. See Goldberg, supra note 10, at 522
n.154.
243 See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding a Florida law that disallowed women from
being selected for jury service unless they volunteered); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a
Michigan law that banned certain women from serving as bartenders).
244 In Goesaert, for instance, the Court held that Michigan had a rational basis for banning women, except
the wives or daughters of male bar owners, from tending bars. 335 U.S. at 466–67.
245 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971).
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lacked the characteristic deference to legislative judgments that is associated
with rational basis review. The state’s justification for the preference was to
avoid controversy when more than one person applied to administer the will.246
The Court dismissed the rationale summarily, criticizing the policy as “the
very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”247 The Court added, without further
explanation, that “whatever may be said as to the positive values of avoiding
intrafamily controversy, the choice in this context may not lawfully be
mandated solely on the basis of sex.”248 Even as Reed pledged allegiance to
rational basis review, it marked a sharp sub silentio departure from it.
The Reed approach did not long endure, however. Two years later, in
Frontiero v. Richardson, a plurality of the Court pushed to shift gender from
rational basis review into strict scrutiny by claiming gender as a suspect
classification.249 The dispute in Frontiero concerned a federal policy that
made it easier for male military personnel than for female military personnel to
claim their spouses as dependents for benefits purposes.250 The appropriate
standard of review for gender-based restrictions became the focal point of the
case and fractured the Court.
The proposition that sex classifications should be subjected to strict
scrutiny found only four votes: Justice Brennan was joined by Justices
Douglas, White, and Marshall.251 Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun
and Chief Justice Burger, wrote an opinion that reached the same result on the
authority of Reed without elevating sex classifications to suspect status.252 The
concurrence declined to decide whether sex was a suspect class because the
statute failed even under the lesser measure of Reed-style rational basis
review.253

246

Id. at 76.
Id.
248 Id. at 76–77.
249 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973).
250 Id. at 678–79.
251 Id. at 678.
252 Id. at 691–92 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
253 See id. at 692. The Powell concurrence also argued that for the Court to decide the issue, it would
effectively preempt democratic deliberations on precisely this issue, as the Equal Rights Amendment was then
under consideration, and would have the effect of making sex a suspect classification. Id. Justice Stewart
concurred separately, and Justice Rehnquist dissented, adopting the opinion of the district court. Id. at 691.
247
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The status of sex classifications in equal protection analysis reached an
equilibrium of sorts in 1976 with Craig v. Boren.254 Reed and Frontiero had
demonstrated that no majority of the Court was satisfied with analyzing sex
classifications under rational basis review, and no majority was willing to
apply strict scrutiny. In Craig, the Court resolved this impasse by creating a
new option: an intermediate standard of review for classifications relating to
sex.
The case concerned an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of lowalcohol beer to women younger than age eighteen, and to men younger than
age twenty-one.255 Writing for a bare majority, Justice Brennan articulated a
new standard of review for gender distinctions as a distillation of recent
practice. Citing to Reed, Frontiero, and other cases, he wrote: “To withstand
constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives.”256 The government objective
asserted here was public safety, and the state had sought to demonstrate the
statute’s fit with statistical evidence showing, most pertinently, that men ages
eighteen to twenty were much more likely to be arrested for drunk driving than
women of the same age.257 The Court concluded that this evidence was
insufficient to establish the requisite substantial relation: only 2% of the men in
this cohort were found to drive drunk, and penalizing them all was
unjustified.258
Justice Brennan’s intermediate standard in Craig won the support of a
majority on the Court—and was applied in subsequent cases—but fewer than
half of the Justices on the Craig Court endorsed the standard without
reservation. Justices Powell and Stevens both joined the opinion but wrote
separately to express misgivings over the introduction of a new, intermediate
standard for sex-based classifications. Justice Powell candidly discussed the
problems with two-tiered analysis and Reed’s divergence from traditional
rational basis review, but he preferred proceeding under Reed’s nominal
rational basis review to “a further subdividing of equal protection analysis.”259

254
255
256
257
258
259

429 U.S. 190 (1976).
Id. at 191–92.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 199–200.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 211 n.* (Powell, J., concurring).
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Justice Stevens, for his part, challenged the value of the tiered analysis
altogether. He began:
There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every
State to govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply one
standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other
cases. Whatever criticism may be leveled at a judicial opinion
implying that there are at least three such standards applies with the
260
same force to a double standard.

In his own analysis of the statute, Justice Stevens emphasized the poorness of
fit between the statute and the alleged purpose in his decision to strike it
down.261
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented. Justice Rehnquist in
particular visited scorn on the creation of a new standard, emphasizing the
arbitrariness and novelty of Justice Brennan’s formulation:
The Court’s conclusion that a law which treats males less
favorably than females “must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives” apparently comes out of thin air. The Equal Protection
Clause contains no such language, and none of our previous cases
adopt that standard. I would think we have had enough difficulty
with the two standards of review which our cases have recognized—
the norm of “rational basis,” and the “compelling state interest”
required where a “suspect classification” is involved—so as to
counsel weightily against the insertion of still another “standard”
262
between those two.

Justice Rehnquist also faulted the content of this standard—in particular, the
qualifiers “important” and “substantial”—as not lending themselves to
perspicuous judicial application.263 The dissent further faulted the majority for
rejecting the statistical evidence proffered by the state, which showed higher
drinking while driving among young men than women, in support of the
policy.264

260
261
262
263
264

Id. at 211–12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 213–14.
Id. at 220–21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 221.
Id. at 225–26.
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In the years after Craig v. Boren, the Court accepted and applied an
intermediate scrutiny standard to sex classifications in a number of cases.265
But even as the standard seemed settled, the formula for review proved less
than completely stable. Starting with the 1979 case Personnel Administrator v.
Feeney,266 a number of decisions emphasized the stringency of the Craig v.
Boren test by noting that it requires “an exceedingly persuasive justification”
from the government.267 In striking down Virginia Military Institute’s (VMI)
exclusion of women in 1996, Justice Ginsburg for the Court interpreted “an
exceedingly persuasive justification” not merely as a characterization of the
standard, but as the standard itself.268 The Court found fault with Virginia’s
proffered justification—that the exclusion of women was necessary to
achieving VMI’s mission—because some women who would want to attend
VMI could meet its standards.269 The ratcheting up of intermediate scrutiny in
the majority opinion did not escape the notice or criticism of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, concurring, or Justice Scalia in dissent. Chief Justice Rehnquist
faulted the new language as having less “content and specificity” than the older
formula270—which he had previously criticized for its own opacity.271 For his
part, Justice Scalia excoriated the majority at length for its application of
intermediate scrutiny in a manner that, in his view, amounted to strict
scrutiny.272

265 See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (applying intermediate scrutiny to unemployment
benefits provided by the Social Security Act to a father, but not a mother); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)
(applying intermediate scrutiny to Alabama statute under which husbands, but not wives, may be required to
make alimony payments); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (applying intermediate scrutiny to
benefits provided by the Social Security Act that favor female wage owners over similarly situated male wage
owners).
266 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
267 See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S.
455, 461 (1981).
268 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). The groundwork for this move was laid by
Hogan and J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). In these cases, the Court also characterized
the defendant’s burden as providing “an exceedingly persuasive justification” for the discrimination. But, in
the Court’s analysis, the way to meet this burden was, in essence, to show a substantial relation to an important
governmental interest: the test derived from Craig.
269 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550.
270 See id. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
271 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 219–21 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
272 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 570–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Only the amorphous ‘exceedingly persuasive
justification’ phrase, and not the standard elaboration of intermediate scrutiny, can be made to yield this
conclusion that VMI’s single-sex composition is unconstitutional because there exist several women (or, one
would have to conclude under the Court’s reasoning, a single woman) willing and able to undertake VMI’s
program. Intermediate scrutiny has never required a least-restrictive-means analysis, but only a ‘substantial
relation’ between the classification and the state interests that it serves.”).
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As Kathleen Sullivan has written, “Intermediate scrutiny, unlike the poles
of the two-tier system, is an overtly balancing mode.”273 The Supreme Court’s
development of an intermediate scrutiny standard reflects how ill-equipped the
bifurcated review regime is for evaluating the range of gender-based
distinctions in public law. But creating this new standard hardly fixed the
problems of tiered review. First, the new standard is ad hoc and improvised,
and as such, lacks roots in constitutional theory.274 And second, introducing
another tier of analysis may resolve a case, but it does not necessarily offer a
workable solution to future cases with different questions and contexts. The
post-Craig drift in the intermediate scrutiny standard shows that the formula is
unstable and, if anything, has grown more contentious over time.
2. Undue Burdens and Abortion Rights
The “undue burden” standard in abortion cases is another doctrinal device
introduced to allow some latitude for balancing in a field of law previously
governed by a rigid tiered review standard. In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that
restrictions on abortion before the point of viability would be subject to strict
scrutiny.275 Given the Court’s rightward shift over the following two decades,
Casey, which came before the Court in 1992, was widely expected to overturn
Roe.276 The Court’s use of strict scrutiny in abortion cases had been under
attack on the Court since 1989, with a plurality of Justices urging that
restrictions on abortions should be subject only to rational basis review.277 In
fact, Casey’s lead plurality opinion, authored jointly by Justices O’Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, preserved the right to terminate pregnancies before the
point of viability, but offered an undue burden standard to replace strict
scrutiny as the framework for evaluating restrictions on that right.278 The
plurality explained that a state places an undue burden on the right when “a
state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”279 The plurality
273

Sullivan, supra note 8, at 297 (internal quotation marks omitted).
As Justice Rehnquist pointedly noted in dissent, the Craig test—that measures must be substantially
related to the achievement of important government objectives—seems to “come[] out of thin air.” Craig, 429
U.S. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
275 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
276 See David Margolick, Seeking Strength in Independence, Abortion-Rights Unit Quits A.C.L.U., N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 1992, at A20 (“It is in [Casey], argued last month before the Supreme Court, that abortionrights advocates expect the Court to either overturn or to greatly weaken Roe v. Wade.”).
277 Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 517–19 (1989) (plurality opinion).
278 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
279 Id.
274
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opinion conceded that Justices might agree on the standard and yet disagree on
its application in a concrete case: “Even when jurists reason from shared
premises, some disagreement is inevitable. That is to be expected in the
application of any legal standard which must accommodate life’s complexity.
We do not expect it to be otherwise with respect to the undue burden
standard.”280
Although the Casey dissenters alleged that the undue burden standard was
an unprecedented and unprincipled invention,281 judges had previously
undertaken undue burden analysis when asked to balance competing interests,
in the abortion context and elsewhere.282 Notably, the undue burden language
mirrors almost exactly the “unreasonable burden” standard applied in early
dormant Commerce Clause cases.283 In our view, the proliferation of undue
burden standards in U.S. constitutional law is not accidental. This standard,
like the move to intermediate scrutiny, is a means to allow courts to consider
the interests on both sides of a constitutional controversy. The introduction of
such devices in domains previously governed by the bifurcated review regime
is symptomatic of the mismatch between the rigidity of the doctrinal structures
a court has inherited and the demands placed on constitutional judges in
complex disputes raising multiple important values.
3. Juvenile Curfew and Equal Protection
The discussion above illustrates how intermediate scrutiny came into being,
as a result of the struggle to situate the review of sex classifications within
equal protection doctrine. The cases below, which concern youth curfews,
illustrate how the introduction of this new tier has added a measure of
flexibility, but also a dose of confusion, to equal protection analysis when
280

Id. at 878 (citation omitted).
See id. at 964 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (describing
the undue burden standard as “created largely out of whole cloth by the authors of the joint opinion”).
282 Abortion rights opinions that discuss some form of undue burden analysis include City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 463 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
473 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976). For more on the use of undue burden standards in and
out of the abortion rights context, see Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden
Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867 (1994); Valerie J. Pacer, Note, Salvaging the Undue
Burden Standard—Is It a Lost Cause? The Undue Burden Standard and Fundamental Rights Analysis, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 295 (1995). One author notes that 256 Supreme Court decisions issued between 1945 and
1993 contain the phrase undue burden or the equivalent. Curtis E. Harris, An Undue Burden: Balancing in an
Age of Relativism, 18 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 363, 423 (1993).
283 See supra Part II.A.
281
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issues of first impression arise. Intermediate scrutiny makes it easier for courts
to strike an appropriate balance between the poles of strict scrutiny and rational
basis deference. But because intermediate scrutiny is not so much a
theoretically justified standard as a “Goldilocks” solution—a happy midpoint
between these extremes—courts seeking to sort new legal issues into the tiers
have little guidance.
A number of appeals courts have encountered challenges to local youth
curfews over the past two decades, and the results—both as to standard of
review and as to outcome—have varied wildly. The Second Circuit held that a
youth curfew should be examined under intermediate scrutiny and struck it
down.284 The D.C. Circuit and Fourth Circuit each applied intermediate
scrutiny to a challenged curfew but went on to uphold it.285 The Fifth Circuit
determined that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard and sustained a
curfew under that standard.286 The Ninth Circuit also applied strict scrutiny
and struck down a curfew.287 Of course, nothing is unusual about circuit splits
and differences in approach, and courts always frame issues based on how
litigants frame their claims. But we contend that the tiered review framework
generates an extra measure of uncertainty and disagreement. (We note also
that all of the cases mentioned above included dissents—an unusual feature in
appeals court decisions and another measure of the discord that these cases
produce.) We illustrate how the framework fails to provide adequate guidance
by looking more closely at one case, the most recent, from the Second Circuit.
Youth curfews present a double challenge to equal protection analysis.
They seem to implicate both the fundamental rights and the suspect
classification prongs of equal protection doctrine, but a categorical approach to
either prong would not subject curfews to any real scrutiny. The mobility right
at issue is an important one, but not one conventionally included in the canon
of “fundamental” rights. And while juveniles are a discrete, vulnerable group,
age is not considered a suspect classification. Courts that believe youth
curfews merit more than minimal scrutiny will therefore find themselves
pushing against the categorical approach to equal protection analysis.

284

Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 176, 186 (2d Cir. 2003).
Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 541, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc); Schleifer v. City
of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847, 855 (4th Cir. 1998).
286 Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1993).
287 Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1997).
285
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Ramos ex rel. Ramos v. Town of Vernon concerned a challenge to a
nighttime curfew, established in 1994 by local ordinance, for persons under
age eighteen. Angel Ramos, a minor resident of Vernon, Connecticut, and his
parents sued the town in 1998, claiming, among other things, that the curfew
impermissibly burdened the fundamental rights of minors.288
The district court’s analysis of this claim was something of a jumble. First,
the court seemed to rule out a higher measure of scrutiny for this ordinance
based on its disparate treatment of juveniles, reasoning that age is not a suspect
classification.289 Then the court moved to take up the plaintiffs’ claim that the
ordinance violated a fundamental right to travel. But without pausing to
consider whether this ordinance implicated any such right, the court
immediately circled back to the relevance of the minor plaintiff’s age to his
constitutional claim. The court observed that “[t]he Supreme Court has never
clearly indicated the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to legislation that
affects minors,” but noted reasons given in the Bellotti plurality decision for
treating children’s constitutional rights differently than those of adults.290 In
the next sentence the court concluded, “After careful consideration of the
Bellotti factors and other Supreme Court jurisprudence involving minors,”291
the youth curfew should be subject to “less than the strictest level of scrutiny,”
that is, intermediate scrutiny.292 The court did not share its “careful
consideration” of these issues with the reader, and the choice of intermediate
scrutiny was presented as a fait accompli.
With the standard selected, the court’s analysis of the equal protection
claim was brisk. Because the plaintiffs did not deny the importance of the
town’s stated interests—protecting the community from crime, and the safety
and welfare of minors—the analysis turned on the issue of fit: Were the
ordinance’s means substantially related to these goals? The court concluded
that they were. The court noted that crime in Vernon had dropped since

288 See Ramos ex rel. Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 48 F. Supp. 2d 176, 188 (D. Conn. 1999), rev’d, 353
F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2003). Ramos also raised vagueness, First Amendment overbreadth, and Fourth Amendment
claims against the statute, as well as claims arising under the Connecticut constitution. Id. at 180–81. His
parents also alleged infringement of their right as parents to direct the raising of their children. Id. at 181. The
district court rejected all of the federal claims and certified the state law claims to the Connecticut Supreme
Court, id. at 188, which rejected them. See Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 761 A.2d 705, 710 (Conn. 2000).
289 Ramos, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 184.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id. (quoting Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation
mark omitted).
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enactment of the curfew, and while declining to assert a causal connection, the
court deferred to the legislative judgment that the ordinance was effective.293
The court also noted that the ordinance’s limited hours were not unduly
burdensome and that the numerous exceptions allowed most unobjectionable
activities to continue after dark.294
The plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which
reversed the district court, finding an equal protection violation.295 The bulk of
the Second Circuit’s analysis concerned selecting the proper tier for evaluating
the curfew. Although the appeals court’s inquiry was far more expansive than
the district court’s, it too came up short, as the court arrived at the intermediate
standard through a process of elimination and provided few affirmative reasons
for why intermediate scrutiny was appropriate.
The court began its analysis by declaring that the curfew implicated the
fundamental right to intrastate travel, a right previously recognized in the
Second Circuit.296 The court then asked whether this curfew, which would
receive strict scrutiny if applied to adults, should be reviewed under a less
stringent standard because it applies only to juveniles.297 The court noted that
other circuits had reviewed curfews under each of the tiers and proceeded to
consider the different approaches.298
First the court considered, and rejected, rational basis review. The court
found no justification for concluding that juveniles are excluded from the right
to intrastate travel, although greater limits on their rights than adults’ rights
may be permissible, owing to the vulnerabilities and other characteristics of
minors. Since “denying the existence of a constitutional right is too blunt an
instrument to resolve the question of juvenile rights to freedom of movement,”
the court would “prefer to admit minors to the protected zone and then engage
in a balancing of constitutional rights and children’s vulnerabilities.”299
The court then considered, and rejected, strict scrutiny. “Strict scrutiny,”
the court argued, “embodies a constitutional preference for ‘blindness,’” and

293
294
295
296
297
298
299

Id. at 185–86.
Id.
Ramos ex rel. Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 187 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 176.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 178.
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should be deployed only where blindness as to classifications is desired.300 In
the equal protection context, some rights—the fundamental rights—are so
important that they should almost always be available without reference to any
group classifications, and some classifications—the suspect classifications—
are in themselves so pernicious that the state should almost never use them.
But, the court noted, “youth-blindness is not a goal in the allocation of
constitutional rights.”301 Hence, strict scrutiny was not appropriate. The court
concluded, almost by default, that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate
standard: “Hence, strict scrutiny would appear to be too restrictive a test to
address government actions that implicate children’s constitutional rights.
Consequently, we choose the second of the three approaches described above
and apply intermediate scrutiny.”302
A couple of features are worth noting about the court’s selection of a
standard of review. First, the analysis implicitly treats intermediate review as a
residual category, to be adopted when neither of the traditional standards of
review is suited to the issue at hand. This is consistent with the genesis of
intermediate review, but hardly adequate as a justification for choosing a
standard of review. Nowhere did the court build up an affirmative case for
intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review (although the court
did note that intermediate review has some advantages). Second, in choosing a
standard, the court slipped from the fundamental rights prong of equal
protection analysis into a kind of suspect class view. According to the court’s
analysis, strict scrutiny is appropriate where “blindness” is the goal.303 But the
court treated this case as belonging to the fundamental rights prong of equal
protection analysis, not the suspect classification prong.304 As the court
presented the issue, the relevant question to determine if strict scrutiny was
appropriate is whether freedom of movement is so important a right that it
should be afforded to individuals without regard to group classifications.305
Instead, however, the court asked whether blindness to age is a goal in the
allocation of constitutional rights.306
300

Id. at 179.
Id.
302 Id. at 180 (citation omitted). The court went on to argue that intermediate scrutiny is flexible enough
to allow legislation properly drafted to address the needs and vulnerability of children, but probing enough to
disallow legislation justified by facile and untested generalizations about the young. Id. at 181.
303 Id. at 179 (internal quotation marks omitted).
304 See id. at 181 n.4 (noting that the Supreme Court has not generally considered age to be a suspect
classification).
305 See id. at 179–81.
306 Id.
301
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Having settled on intermediate scrutiny, the court then proceeded to
evaluate the curfew. The court identified two of the interests invoked by
Vernon—protecting minors from harm and protecting the community from
youth crime at night—as important.307 The question became whether the
ordinance has a substantial relation to these goals. The court found it did
not.308 Although the ordinance was prompted by a concern about crime, the
town provided no good reasons for its particular features: for the hours it was
in effect, or for its application to minors. Nor was there any proof that the
curfew was responsible for a drop in crime.309 Therefore, the court concluded,
the curfew violated equal protection.310
In a wide-ranging dissent, Judge Ralph Winter took issue with, among
other things, the court’s selection of intermediate scrutiny. Judge Winter
emphasized the well-established legal recognition of children’s custodial
control by their parents, and denied that minors had a right to travel
independent of parental control.311 Hence, the curfew should be subjected only
to rational basis review, and upheld.312
4. Evaluation
The examples above demonstrate the persistent instability of tiered review.
Some critics—including the authors of some of the dissents—might counter
that this “instability” is really just a lack of judicial discipline. Nothing forces
judges to adopt new standards such as intermediate scrutiny or the undue
burden test; when judges do so, they are recklessly pushing a political agenda
without respect for precedent. We note first that this charge cannot be leveled
at the curfew ruling: when courts face questions of first impression, existing
doctrine offers little or no guidance as to what standard should govern.313 And
even if the pathologies of bifurcated review did not produce a Casey or a Craig
in any deterministic sense, these rulings and many others are best understood
as responses to the shortcomings of tiered review.

307

Id. at 182.
Id. at 185–87.
309 Id. at 186.
310 Id.
311 Id. at 188 (Winter, J., dissenting).
312 Id. at 190–91. The dissent also considered, and rejected, the claim that the curfew burdened parental
or guardian rights. Id. at 190.
313 Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (evaluating the firearms restriction
without selecting a standard of review).
308
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Consider the sex discrimination cases again. The two-tiered framework put
judges in an impossible position: choosing between these dichotomous
standards of review meant committing either to uphold, or to strike down,
virtually every gender distinction in law. In this situation, the incentive to find,
or create, some middle ground was powerful. That middle ground took the
form of intermediate scrutiny. And the improvisatory character of intermediate
scrutiny opened the door for its future evolution. If intermediate scrutiny had
started life as a distinct standard of review with a deep grounding in
constitutional theory rather than as a workaround to the difficulties of
bifurcated review, the VMI majority might have found it more difficult to
change the operative test.314 Of course, the members of the Court are
responsible for the particular ways in which sex discrimination caselaw has
developed. But the broadest outlines of this development are influenced by the
doctrinal structures that confront the Justices and constrain their moves.
PA offers a more stable, principled alternative. As a unified framework of
analysis that allows a court to tailor the stringency of review to the particulars
of each claim, PA sidesteps the conflict and confusion surrounding the choice
of a standard of review. Nor is this approach a far-fetched departure for
American law. As we have noted, Justices Marshall and Stevens have
proposed something similar for equal protection claims. Justice Marshall has
argued that “the level of scrutiny employed in an equal protection case should
vary with ‘the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely
affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the
particular classification is drawn.’”315 Adopting such an approach would not
eliminate disagreement among judges, but it would refocus the disagreement
onto the substantive issues of importance.
The jurisprudence of the GFCC gives a glimpse into what a
proportionality-based approach to an equality right looks like.316 Naturally,
important differences exist between the Basic Law’s Article 3, which
guarantees equality before the law, and the Constitution’s Fourteenth

314

See supra text accompanying notes 268–70.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 460 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
316 A good overview of the doctrine in English can be found in Susanne Baer, Equality: The
Jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249 (1999). A more detailed
treatment, albeit in German, can be found in a constitutional commentary, such as HANS D. JARASS & BODO
PIEROTH, GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 90–137 (2006).
315
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Amendment.317 And of course, adopting PA does not mean reaching the same
outcomes as the German court—indeed, the Supreme Court could use PA and
still replicate most of the judgments that they have arrived at by other means,
and are worth preserving. Still, the GFCC’s approach to Article 3 shows how
proportionality can provide a stable argumentation framework for dealing with
the most difficult legal issues.318
Since the 1980s, the GFCC has construed the general equality right in ways
that are tailor-made for PA. The right amounts to a guarantee that any unequal
treatment under the law be justified by a “sufficiently weighty reason.”319
What counts as a sufficient reason depends on the particulars of the claim. In
effect, the more a distinction in the law threatens the core values of equality,
the greater the state’s burden of justification.320 For instance, when a
challenged measure cuts across the exercise of a fundamental right, or when
groups are disadvantaged based on personal characteristics rather than
voluntary behavior, the Court insists on “a strict application of the
proportionality requirement.”321 On the other hand, when a measure implicates
none of these factors, or falls within the particular competence of the
legislature, the Court operates with a healthy degree of deference to
distinctions drawn by the legislature. 322 Proportionality is no silver bullet, and
Germany’s equality jurisprudence has not been free of controversy.323 But the
basic framework, grounded in PA, has been stable and widely accepted.
With respect to abortion politics, which have been ferocious in Germany,324
the GFCC’s jurisprudence has had a legitimizing and stabilizing effect. The
GFCC has issued two landmark rulings on abortion, roughly contemporaneous

317 One notable difference is that Article 3 spells out what we would call “suspect classifications,” on the
basis of which discrimination is not allowed. GG art. 3(3) (“No person shall be favoured or disfavoured
because of sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions. No
person shall be disfavoured because of disability.”); see also id. art. 3(2) (specifically addressing sex equality).
318 PA is not used across the board in the GFCC’s Article 3 jurisprudence, but increasingly it is
supplanting older approaches. See Baer, supra note 316, at 260. We focus our discussion on the “new”
proportionality-based approach to the general equality guarantee in Article 3(1).
319 BVerfG Apr. 28, 1999, 100 BVERFGE 138 (174); see also BVerfG May 30, 1990, 82 BVerfGE 126.
320 JARASS & PIEROTH, supra note 316, at 100; Baer, supra note 316, at 262.
321 BVerfG Mar. 2, 1999, 99 BVerfGE 367 (388).
322 JARASS & PIEROTH, supra note 316, at 99, 100. The legislature has substantial latitude, for instance, in
choosing the subjects and rates of taxation. Id. at 109.
323 For a (now somewhat dated) overview of prominent critiques and controversies, see ALBERT
BLECKMANN, DIE STRUKTUR DES ALLGEMEINEN GLEICHHEITSSATZES 1–2 (1995).
324 ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 109–14 (2000).
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with Roe and Casey.325 These rulings established that, given Germany’s
responsibility for the Holocaust and other crimes against humanity prior to and
during World War II, the criminal law must always discourage abortion as a
taking of life, but that abortion would nonetheless be permitted under certain
specified conditions.
In its 1975 decision, and in contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach,
the GFCC held that the right to life covers the fetus.326 That finding comprised
the critical starting point from which the balancing would proceed, given that
the constitutional value represented by the life of the unborn child will, at
times, conflict with the constitutional rights of the woman carrying the child,
her human dignity, bodily integrity, and the free development of her
personality.327 Summarizing a rich and sophisticated decision, the court held
that to permit abortion without restriction, and without the express
disapprobation of the state, would infringe too much on the right to life, and
would therefore be unconstitutional;328 it also insisted, however, that the right
to life did not extinguish the rights of pregnant women.329 Indeed, the court
ruled, the latter’s rights must prevail in special circumstances. Although
abortion could not be decriminalized per se, the procedure could nonetheless
go unpunished after mandatory counseling and when justified by genetic,
medical, or social hardship reasons, or when the pregnancy resulted from
rape.330
In 1993, the GFCC upheld the basics of its earlier ruling, while creating an
“unreasonable burden” (Unzumutbarkeit) test. The test is rooted in the logic of
proportionality: abortions would be tolerated by the criminal law if carrying a
fetus to term would impose on a pregnant woman “heavy and unusual
burdens” that go well beyond “reasonable sacrifice.”331 That is, “another
interest”—of bodily integrity and self-determination—“equally worthy of
constitutional protection asserts itself with such urgency that the state’s legal

325 BVerfG May 28, 1993, 88 BVERFGE 203 (“Abortion II”); BVerfG Feb. 25, 1975, 39 BVERFGE 1
(“Abortion I”).
326 A careful comparison of the two approaches can be found in Richard E. Levy & Alexander Somek,
Paradoxical Parallels in the American and German Abortion Decisions, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 109
(2001). An abridged translation of the two key German decisions is contained in KOMMERS, supra note 21, at
336–56.
327 88 BVERFGE 203 (253).
328 39 BVERFGE 1 (44–46).
329 Id. at 47.
330 Id. at 48–50.
331 88 BVERFGE 203 (255); 39 BVerfGE 1 (48).
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order cannot require the pregnant woman always to defer to the rights of the
unborn.”332 Although scholars have debated whether the Unzumutbarkeit
standard is identical to, or partially distinct from, proportionality,333 “the
practical effect of the Unzumutbarkeit principle is to balance the unborn child’s
right to life against the mother’s interest in bodily integrity and personal
autonomy.”334
Comparing the abortion jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court and the
GFCC, and its broader reception, reveals some striking commonalities and
differences. The baseline constitutional rules in the two countries appear as
opposites: the right to access abortion services prohibits a ban on abortions in
the United States, while the unborn child’s right to life requires restrictions on
abortion in Germany. But as both courts have balanced, they have presided
over a convergence in abortion law.335 Since Roe, however, abortion has
become far and away the most controversial issue the Supreme Court touches,
dominating the discourse during the confirmation of Justices and creating a
social movement that challenges the political legitimacy of the Court itself.336
The GFCC’s rulings on abortion were also politically controversial, but not
because they were understood to be inconsistent, unprincipled, and inherently
political.337
We do not claim that proportionality is the key variable that explains this
latter difference. But it plays a crucial role in political acceptance of the
GFCC’s involvement in regulating abortion. In both abortion cases discussed
above, the GFCC anchored its analysis in balancing, whose legitimacy had
been built over previous decades. This technique allowed the GFCC to give
due consideration to the competing interests at stake, and required that the
judges seek to reduce harms as much as possible. Both German cases
generated hard-hitting dissents.
But no dissenter questioned the
332

39 BVERFGE 1 (50) (quoted in KOMMERS, supra note 21, at 341).
See RÜDIGER KONRADIN ALBRECHT, ZUMUTBARKEIT ALS VERFASSUNGSMASSSTAB (1995)
(distinguishing Unzumutbarkeit from proportionality).
334 Levy & Somek, supra note 326, at 122.
335 Id. at 111 (“In both countries, abortion is generally available early in the pregnancy after various
informational, counseling and waiting restrictions; and is available later in the pregnancy to protect the life or
health of the mother, as well as in cases of serious fetal deformity, rape, or incest.”).
336 See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).
337 The difference in tone extends to the bench as well. The German abortion rulings produced dissents,
but none that challenged the legitimacy of the majority’s ruling, or the good faith of the justices, like Justice
Scalia’s blistering dissent in Casey. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 982–1002
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
333
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appropriateness of balancing; rather, they challenged the relative weights given
to the values in tension by the majority when it balanced.
IV. ALL THINGS IN PROPORTION?
A. Bringing Proportionality Back In
We have shown that the tiered review regime chronically generates
pathologies that have weakened rights protection and undermined the
coherence of rights jurisprudence in the United States.338 PA, while not a cureall for the challenges facing constitutional courts, avoids these pathologies by
providing a relatively systematic, transparent, and trans-substantive analytical
procedure for the adjudication of virtually all rights claims. We also found that
all three levels of review—rational basis, intermediate review, and strict
scrutiny—have, at various points in their evolution, contained core elements of
proportionality. In our view, this finding bolsters our claim that no rightsprotecting court can, in practice, do without these elements unless it is willing
to commit itself to a posture of abdication or absolutism.
Together, these findings lead to the conclusion that embracing
proportionality may well enhance the consistency and transparency of U.S.
constitutional rights adjudication in a manner that keeps faith with our
constitutional traditions and commitments. No single, simple formula predicts
how U.S. courts might go about amplifying and regularizing the elements of
proportionality that already exist, sometimes partially buried, in our
doctrines.339 While a detailed roadmap for this process is beyond the scope of

338

See supra Part III.
As we noted before, a number of areas of American constitutional law have interest-balancing tests
that resemble PA. Justice Breyer lists some of these in his Heller dissent. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570, 690 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377,
403 (2000) (citing examples where the Court has taken such an approach); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr.,
535 U.S. 357, 388 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (commercial speech); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433
(1992) (election regulation); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339–49 (1976) (procedural due process);
Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (government employee speech).
The Supreme Court has employed balancing tests outside of the constitutional context as well. Perhaps most
famously, the “rule of reason” used to evaluate combinations and contracts in restraint of trade under section 1
of the Sherman Act is a balancing test: the court asks whether net effect of a restriction on trade is procompetitive. See Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Indeed, in recent years federal appeals
courts have supplemented the Board of Trade balancing with an LRM test, so that the total effect closely
resembles PA. See Gabriel A. Feldman, The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of
Reason Analysis, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 561, 580 (2009). Election law, too, has turned with increasing frequency
to a standard that balances the state’s interest against the burden on an individual’s right to vote in a manner
339
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this Article, we do suggest, in broadest strokes, some possibilities. We hope
these remarks might spark a broader discussion of what the reconciliation of
U.S. rights review and proportionality might look like. We conclude by noting
and responding to objections to the arguments we have presented in this
Article.
As a starting point, we note again that Justices Marshall and Stevens have
proposed, in concurrences and dissents, approaches to equal protection analysis
that would displace tiered review in favor of a “sliding scale” review that more
nearly approximates proportionality.340
Justice Marshall explained his
alternative to the Court’s “rigidified approach to equal protection analysis” in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: “As the nexus between
the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws
closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the
degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a
discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly.”341 For his part, Justice
Stevens proposed a single standard, under which the state’s justificatory
burden in establishing a “rational basis” for legislation is pegged to the
classification employed—it is easier to provide a legitimate, neutral reason for
treating people differently on the basis of profession, say, than on the basis of
race.342
Although the two standards are different,343 either could serve as a foothold
for a PA-style, interest-balancing approach in equal protection analysis.
Approaching equal protection in the spirit of Justice Marshall or Justice
Stevens does not require the Court to reject existing doctrinal standards; rather,
it provides a way to make sense of precedent by locating doctrine in a more
expansive and coherent framework. For instance, the sliding scale perspective
unlocks a reappraisal of the compelling state interest test: what qualifies as a
“compelling” interest for overcoming a rights claim will vary based on the
intensity of the right infringement. This perspective thus helps to recover the
original role of strict scrutiny analysis as a form of rights-protective interest
balancing. In this view, the other standards of review represent points along a
resembling proportionality. See Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND.
L.J. (forthcoming 2011).
340 See James E. Fleming, “There Is Only One Equal Protection Clause”: An Appreciation of Justice
Stevens’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301, 2305–08 (2006) (describing the
positions of both Justices).
341 411 U.S. 1, 102–03 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
342 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452–53 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
343 See Goldberg, supra note 10, at 519–24.
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continuous spectrum of scrutiny, within a common master methodology.344
Over time, the Court could elaborate these doctrinal structures into a more
articulated framework where means–ends testing and interest balancing are
handled in distinct phases. And this proportionality standard could be applied,
not only in equal protection but wherever tiered review now is operative.
Pushing further, we see no reason to limit the adoption of PA to areas now
governed by the three-tier regime. Justice Breyer, joined in his Heller dissent
by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, forcefully argued that the American
approach to rights adjudication has always included elements of
proportionality and balancing. 345 He then went on to demonstrate how a
version of PA should be applied to the Second Amendment.346 The Second
Amendment identifies a value to be maximized, subject to certain limitations.
There is no question—and the majority did not suggest—that the right to bear
arms implies that no restrictions (for instance, on any type of weapon, in any
circumstance) are permitted. Once the Court determines that the Second
Amendment covers an individual’s right to bear arms outside of a militia
context, the crucial questions must concern limits, which PA is designed to
address. In his dissent, Justice Breyer applied a version of PA to show that
reasoning about limits could proceed in a principled, open way. Certainly PA
would have provided a surer guide to future cases in this area than the
majority’s approach. In declining even to pick a standard of review under
which to evaluate state limitation of the right to bear arms, Justice Scalia
provided no guidance for future cases.
But a case like Heller is a rarity in that it presents a question of first
impression about the existence of a right under one of the Constitution’s first
ten amendments. The twenty-first-century Court almost never writes on a
blank slate. Although many other areas of American constitutional law could
benefit from the introduction of the proportionality principle, we also
recognize that good reasons may exist for the Court to treat some rights—such
344 Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that cases in different
tiers “actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion”).
345 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 693–719 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). In a celebrated
2010 commencement address at Harvard, retiring-Justice Souter emphasized the inescapable conflicts between
values involved in constitutional litigation. Justice David H. Souter, Commencement Address at Harvard
University (May 27, 2010), available at http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/05/text-of-justice-davidsouters-speech/.
346 Heller, 554 U.S. at 693–719. In his dissent, Justice Breyer regarded his approach—correctly—not as a
great departure from the Court’s practice, but as a rationalization of techniques already in place, and of a piece
with the standard of review employed in different areas. Id.
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as the Third Amendment’s prohibition against quartering—as clear, per se
rules.347 Still, the Court has already determined, and consistently held, that
most of the rights that are of importance to Americans are relative, not
absolute. Given that the Court already subjects important rights—including
those expressed in absolute terms (e.g., the First Amendment)—to a litany of
limitations and qualifications, courts would be justified in asking the following
two questions. First, why should every constitutional right not be protected by
a necessity standard, that is, why should government be allowed to infringe
more on any right than is necessary to achieve a declared public purpose?
Second, do laws that have passed the narrow tailoring requirement nonetheless
infringe more on the right than is tolerable given our constitutional
commitments? In asking these questions, judges would begin the work of
reconceptualizing rights doctrine in terms of PA.348 Failure to consider these
questions will, in most cases, weaken rights protection.
That PA can fit with existing constitutional doctrine could be illustrated
with reference to examples drawn from every area of the Court’s rights
jurisprudence. Here we will provide one more, concerning procedural due
process claims arising from reputational injuries caused by state action. Such
claims are presently governed by Paul v. Davis.349 Paul concerned a challenge
to a flyer distributed by local police that included the claimant’s name and
photograph in a list of “Active Shoplifters” on the basis of an arrest for
shoplifting that was never prosecuted.350 Paul established that merely showing
that stigmatizing state action abridges liberty interests protected by the due
process guarantee is not enough to establish a due process violation. Rather,
something else, some change in legal status, is also required, though the court
did not explain what should happen once this “stigma plus” threshold is
satisfied.351 Not surprisingly, the Paul decision has been roundly criticized for
failing to set out standards for how courts should evaluate claims to procedural
due process violations emerging from reputational injuries.352

347

U.S. CONST. amend. III.
Cf. SULLIVAN & FRASE, supra note 53, at 173 (proposing that proportionality “be adopted as a general
standard of review”).
349 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
350 Id. at 695.
351 Id. at 701.
352 See Barbara E. Armacost, Race and Reputation: The Real Legacy of Paul v. Davis, 85 VA. L. REV.
569, 571 (1999) (“Scholars have been relentlessly and uniformly negative in their reactions to the Supreme
Court’s opinion and holding in Paul . . . .”); id. at 575–84 (collecting criticisms of Paul).
348
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A PA approach would provide a neat solution to the problem. Once a
triggering stigma is identified, the Court would move into proportionality
mode, asking what state interest is at stake, and whether the stigma-causing
means are suitable for achieving it. The Court would engage the LRM inquiry,
and if that is satisfied, it would move to the final stage of analysis, where it
asks whether the harm to the claimant is justified, all things considered. The
final balancing stage could effectively do the work now done—poorly—by the
nebulous “plus” factor, the work of filtering out de minimis injuries. This use
of PA would also resonate with the Court’s balancing approach in Mathews v.
Eldridge353 and its associated line of due process cases. For our purposes,
most important is that the basic structure of the right—the conditions that have
to be satisfied to state a claim—can be established through the relevant
precedents, and PA can solve the balancing problems that remain.
A necessary task of rights review is defining the scope of rights, that is,
determining the range of conduct that is protected by the right. For instance,
do the protections of the First Amendment extend to obscenity?354 PA is, of
course, only an analytical procedure; it is otherwise without content.
Everywhere PA flourishes, however, judges use it to structure a theory of the
rights they adjudicate. As Mattias Kumm observes, a legal system’s
approaches to the questions of a right’s scope and a right’s limitation are
logically linked.355 So it is in the United States as well. Strict scrutiny, for
example, represents an extremely stringent approach to limiting rights: a
measure infringing a right is permissible only if narrowly tailored to a
compelling interest. The stakes of acknowledging a prima facie rights claim
under strict scrutiny are huge, since the test for infringements stacks the deck
in favor of the right. It makes sense, then, that the Supreme Court would be
reluctant to hold, for instance, that the full measure of First Amendment
protection extends to commercial speech when doing so would lock the Court
into an analysis that steamrolls over limits on, say, liquor advertisements,
without regard to relevant differences between these and forms of expression
nearer to the essential core of the First Amendment.356 A stingy approach to
the limitation of rights goes hand in hand with a stingy approach to the scope

353

424 U.S. 319 (1976).
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (affirming that obscene material is not protected
by the First Amendment).
355 See Mattias Kumm, Who Is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and
the Constitutionalization of Private Law, 7 GERMAN L.J. 341, 347 (2006).
356 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
354

MATHEWS&SWEET GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

5/26/2011 8:59 AM

ALL THINGS IN PROPORTION?

869

of rights: when the decision that a right is in play is so consequential, the
borders of that right’s protection must be carefully policed.
PA offers a different model. As a balancing framework, PA expressly
allows for the possibility that prima facie rights claims may be outweighed by
competing values, as long as the other steps of the proportionality analysis are
satisfied. Because much less hinges on the prima facie determination that any
right can be properly pleaded, judges can afford to define the scope of that
right more broadly. An example can help illustrate how the adoption of PA
would impact U.S. rights review. Free speech jurisprudence recognizes several
carve-outs for expressive activities that merit less than the full measure of First
Amendment protection, including fighting words,357 obscenity,358 child
pornography,359 commercial speech,360 and advocacy of imminent lawless
action.361 In a PA context, a court could arrive at these same outcomes through
an explicit, rather than disguised, balancing process. In effect, the court would
recognize that, in fact, some expressive interests are at stake in these forms of
conduct, but to a lesser degree than in the heartland of First Amendment
speech. Not only does PA all but require the court to construct a theory of
speech rights, it also allows the court to sidestep some of the intractable border
wars that the American penchant for rules and exceptions inevitably generates.
We see few, if any, advantages to an approach that seeks to determine, once
and for all, on which side of a line a particular case falls, or where to draw the
lines separating rules from exceptions in the first place. In any event, the
American version of this approach has never actually succeeded in banishing
balancing from the judicial tool kit. Pushed out the front door, balancing
comes in through the back, where it is used to create ever more nuanced rules
and exceptions.362 In our view, the PA approach is less arbitrary than a binary
“yes/no” response to the complexity of rights adjudication. It builds flexibility
and a concern for context into rights review, and it lessens the likelihood that
judges will paint themselves into doctrinal corners.
Finally, applying PA does not prevent courts from incorporating other
modes of rights reasoning in their analysis. For instance, a court that uses PA

357
358
359
360
361
362

See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 963–71.
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may also categorically reject certain grounds of justification for state action.363
Courts may exclude reasons in this way in order to provide added protection
for important constitutional values.364 Suppose, for instance, that the
government seeks to ban speech promoting certain social or political theories,
on the grounds that they are incorrect and harmful.365 Under existing First
Amendment doctrine, courts will not credit this rationale for government
action. Courts reject the government’s position not because the theories are
not false or harmful—they could be—but because our theory of freedom of
expression excludes reasons for state action based on viewpoint
discrimination.366 Similarly, a PA court sharing the same First Amendment
values may likewise decline to credit the government’s rationale, or give it any
weight in the analysis. In Mattias Kumm’s words, “Freedom of speech is not
balanced against the harm done by proposing false ideas.”367 Indeed, Kumm
correctly notes that PA may exclude reasons at two stages of the analysis: in
assessing the legitimacy of the state’s aim, and in the balancing phase.368
Thus, it is wrong to assume that a move to PA would mean abandoning the
delicate constitutional architecture that American courts have constructed to
give meaning to rights provisions.
B. Objections
We have tried to make the best case for adopting PA in the United States,
but we recognize that there are countervailing considerations. Here, we briefly
discuss some of the important institutional and historical reasons why PA
might appear to be a problematic fit for the American courts.
Formal differences between the American system of judicial review and
other contemporary systems of constitutional justice around the world are
obvious and important. Most powerful supreme and constitutional courts in
the world today understand their central mission to be the robust protection of
fundamental rights, not least since their respective constitutions prioritize
363

See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 38–69 (1986).
See Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law,
45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 713 (1994). Pildes demonstrates that defining excluded reasons was a dominant
technique for adjudicating rights claims in the constitutional jurisprudence of the nineteenth century, id. at
712–13, and Mattias Kumm, supra note 34, at 144–45, emphasizes its role in contemporary constitutional
analysis.
365 See Kumm, supra note 34, at 144–45.
366 Id. at 145.
367 Id.
368 Id.
364
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rights protection.369 Modern constitutions typically announce rights before
state structures are constituted; most rights are qualified by limitation clauses;
and the rights-protecting court is expressly designated as the authoritative
interpreter of the higher law. Further, the European constitutional courts—and
the supreme courts of Canada, India, and South Africa to different degrees—
are not limited to “case or controversy” jurisdiction. Cases come to them in
diverse ways, often in the form of abstract constitutional questions about the
meaning, scope, and application of rights.370 Constitutional judges have an
obligation to answer these questions, no matter how controversial. Indeed,
giving constitutional answers to controversial, deeply “political” questions
about rights is basic to their job description.371 In short, all modern, rightsprotecting courts perform an oracular function, a byproduct of which is law
making (constitutional, legislative, administrative, and so on).372
The American Supreme Court is not a specialized constitutional court. In
contrast to the modern constitutional court, the U.S. Constitution does not
confer on the Court the power of constitutional judicial review. Added as
supplementary “amendments,” rights only surface after the organs of
government are established. Moreover, the American Constitution does not
give interpretive primacy to the judiciary; in fact, perhaps the three branches,
being coequal, have the same claim to competence and the same obligation to
interpret and apply rights faithfully.373 In Marbury v. Madison, of course, the
Court would derive its constitutional judicial review authority directly from its
Article III “case or controversy” jurisdiction.374 Taking a highly formalist
view, all judicial law making in the United States (constitutional, legislative,
and so on) can be understood as a byproduct of the basic judicial (dispute
resolution) function. Of course, to claim that the Supreme Court remains
principally a case or controversy court would do violence to reality,

369

See VÍCTOR FERRERES COMELLA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES 36–54 (2009).
Id. at 66–67; STONE SWEET, supra note 324, at 343–46.
371 See COMELLA, supra note 369, at 72–73.
372 In such systems, the classic distinctions made between the “judicial function” (dispute resolution under
the law) and the “legislative function” (the elaboration of law) break down. In these systems, traditional
notions of separation of powers become weak sources of systemic legitimacy. Instead, the legitimacy of the
constitutional order is critically linked to the constitutional court’s capacities to defend rights.
373 Prominent contemporary defenders of the “departmentalist” position—that neither the Founders nor
the American Constitution meant to grant the judiciary supremacy with respect to constitutional
interpretation—include Akhil Amar and Larry Kramer. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION
(2005); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2004).
374 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
370
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downplaying the Court’s oracular, law-making function. Although few serious
observers would still make that claim, the Article III case or controversy
limitation no doubt comprises an important part of the Supreme Court’s
historical identity as a judicial organ, constraining the Court in meaningful
ways.
These organic differences must impact how rights are understood and how
rights claims are adjudicated. Across Europe, and in Canada and South Africa,
constitutional judges face no serious or sustained challenge to their legitimacy
when they protect rights, at least as a formal matter. Indeed, constitutional
judges would seriously undermine their political legitimacy if they were to
abdicate their rights-protecting role, say, by adopting a rational basis standard
as the norm for protecting rights. In the United States, the specter of original
sin (Marbury)375 and its evil potentials (Lochner),376 the defensive discourse of
the counter-majoritarian difficulty, and the anxiety over what has become de
facto judicial supremacy, has meant that any move by the courts away from
deference and toward robust rights protection needs special justification.377
American judges and legal academics have engaged in a seemingly endless
production and critique of these justifications, but reached little consensus. At
the same time, counterpressure flows from the fact that many of the most
important American rights are expressed in absolute terms, as rules to be
enforced, which makes adopting a blanket rational basis posture deeply
problematic, if not indefensible.
As this discussion implies, a legal system’s rights doctrines constitute, and
will then embody, notions of what rights are in that system. Kumm explains
that such notions tell us “what . . . you have in virtue of having a right.”378
Although the topic raises jurisprudential issues far beyond the scope of this
Article, it should be obvious that important structural differences will still
distinguish doctrines that reference a conception of rights as “trumps” (in
Dworkin’s sense), those that conceive of rights as defensive “shields”
(insulating the sphere of the private from the reach of state action), or as

375

Id.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
377 The most influential statements of the problem and (partial) justification of judicial supremacy remain,
respectively, ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), and JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
378 Kumm, supra note 34, at 131.
376
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“optimization requirements” (in Alexy’s sense).379 The Supreme Court, of
course, has not settled on any dominant “theory” of “what rights are,” which
partly accounts for the systemic incoherence of its rights jurisprudence.
Europeans were forced to rethink and reconstruct their constitutional law
after the horrors of the Holocaust and the destruction of World War II.380 The
new Federal Republic of Germany firmly committed itself to protecting
fundamental rights at the highest possible level, while the prestige of political
parties and legislative authority was relatively low. The collapse of fascistauthoritarian regimes in Southern Europe in the 1970s, and then across Central
and Eastern Europe and the Balkans in the 1990s, reproduced that situation in
key respects, and the German approach to constitutionalism was copied and
extended. During these latter episodes, those who drafted new constitutions
saw no contradiction between democracy and rights protection. On the
contrary, a robust system of rights protection was viewed as a precondition for
democratic rule. Today, even after the consolidation of stable party systems,
European citizenries continue to support constitutional courts—which they
equate with rights protection—far more than they support legislatures. Where
an ideology of fundamental rights has congealed as a kind of civic religion,
rights jurisdiction may ground the legitimacy of constitutional review.
Tellingly, this civic religion of rights now also permeates common law
jurisdictions, including our neighbor to the north, Canada, which (like Israel)
adopted PA from the Europeans.
In the United States, some judges and academics have always portrayed PA
and balancing as antithetical to American notions of popular sovereignty and,
therefore, to democracy itself. We reject this portrayal, not least, as
unsupported by the facts. In the post-New Deal period, when the U.S.
Supreme Court moved to protect fundamental rights more robustly, it too
began to look like a modern, rights-protecting constitutional court and less like
a case or controversy court. The Court relaxed standing doctrines, and abstract
review—in the form of facial challenges and related constitutional remedies—
emerged and became routine in some areas; the Court frankly assumed a more

379

For a careful discussion of this issue, see Mattias Kumm, The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the
Right to Justification: The Point of Rights-Based Proportionality Review, 4 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 140,
144–52 (2010).
380 Jed Rubenfeld argues that, due to this fact, the American and European conceptions of
constitutionalism, rights, and democracy are fundamentally at odds with one another. Jed Rubenfeld, The Two
World Orders, WILSON Q., Autumn 2003, at 22.
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oracular role as a constitutional lawmaker.381 One might say that, for the first
time, a system of constitutional justice began to appear in America, with rights
protection at its core. With the important exception of property rights, the
Court reserved deference doctrines, such as rational basis, for only those rights
judged not to be “fundamental.” Further, it began to theorize the rights being
favored more explicitly, which went hand in hand with the development of
doctrinal tests that one finds central to PA.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have sought to describe and assess the evolution of
American rights doctrine, not just on its own terms, but with reference to
constitutional law and practice elsewhere. Our first motivation was, in fact,
comparative and empirical. In a first stage of this project, we developed a
theoretical explanation of why rights-protecting judges would be attracted to
PA: it provides the best-possible response to the challenges of adjudicating
qualified rights, and it offers a (partial) solution to certain intractable
legitimacy dilemmas generated by judicial law making and supremacy.382 In a
second stage, we tracked the emergence and global diffusion of PA. Today, all
of the world’s most powerful constitutional courts have adopted a version of
PA, which they deploy as an overarching analytical framework for
adjudicating rights. Arguably, PA now constitutes the defining doctrinal core
of a global, rights-based constitutionalism. Here, we have sought to bring
these considerations to bear on the American case, not least because the United
States is often characterized (especially by non-Americans) as an outlier, an
island unto itself, a legal system that refuses to participate in the transnational
conversation about rights adjudication that has exploded into prominence in
recent years. While we would agree that the American constitutionalism is illequipped either to engage in constitutional dialogues across borders or to
exercise positive influence on the evolution of global constitutionalism, it is
not true that the American system has rejected either balancing or
proportionality. Instead, as we have shown, elements of PA have deep roots in
American constitutional law, and American courts, try as they sometimes do,
have never been able to dispense with balancing when they adjudicate rights.

381

See MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS,

(2002).
382

See Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 5, at 80–97.
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Our second motivation was normative. We have argued that the American
courts would benefit, on balance, from standardizing rights doctrine under a
version of PA. To take just one example, we have identified three endemic
pathologies of American rights jurisprudence and shown the various ways in
which PA would enable the courts to mitigate these pathologies, or to eliminate
them altogether. Our normative claims are informed by both our theoretical
priors and our comparative findings. We stressed that one of the virtues of PA
is that it allows a court to maximize its own flexibility, with reference to the
constitutional values and interests it protects, and with regard to present and
future litigants.383 Flexibility inheres in PA in another way: courts can adapt
PA to fit their own purposes. In fact, how courts use PA varies widely across
jurisdictional boundaries.384 To those who would claim that the proportionality
framework is “foreign law” and therefore alien to American constitutionalism,
we would reply that the United States has, at different times, evolved
“homegrown” versions of PA. This Article shows as much. If the Supreme
Court were to develop a more formalized version of PA, along the lines that we
have argued, it would be an American creation, referencing existing caselaw
and consistent with our own constitutional traditions and values. In any event,
the problem of balancing in American rights adjudication lies once again at the
top of the Supreme Court’s agenda. One hopes that, this time, the Justices will
consider more deeply the merits of what is the most tried and tested approach
to that problem: the proportionality principle.385

383 Id. at 163 (“This flexibility, which we count as a virtue rather [than] a vice of PA, is never immune
from attack by those who believe that a more determinate and principled approach to rights adjudication is
possible, or that PA is just a fancy way to package judicial policy-making.”).
384 Id. at 163–64.
385 We close on a note of clarification. Though we believe that PA, as a doctrinal framework for
adjudicating rights claims, performs better overall than any known competitor, we do not argue that it solves
all of the legitimacy dilemmas faced by courts, including the problem of judicial law making. As we wrote:

[T]he key to the political success of PA—its social logic—is that it provides a set of relatively
stable, off-the-shelf, solutions to a set of generic dilemmas faced by the constitutional judge. If
PA mitigates certain legitimacy problems, it also creates, or at least spotlights, an intractable,
second-order, problem. PA does not camouflage judicial lawmaking. Properly employed, it
requires courts to acknowledge and defend—honestly and openly—the policy choices that they
make when they make constitutional choices. Proportionality is not a magic wand that judges
wave to make all of the political dilemmas of rights review disappear. Indeed, waving it will
expose rights adjudication for what it is: constitutionally-based lawmaking. Nonetheless, . . . PA
offers the best position currently available for judges seeking to rationalize and defend rights
review, given certain strategic considerations, the structure of modern rights provisions, and the
precepts of contemporary constitutionalism.
Id. at 77.

